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This court reviews the superior court’s admissibility ruling for an abuse of discretion, id., viewing “the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent.” ¶ 5 (App. 2015) (cleaned up).

He maintains that any objection to the admission of the DNA analyst’s testimony at trial would have been “frivolous”

Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. at 594-95, ¶¶ 17, 19; ¶ 11 (App. 2015).

¶13 In an analogous case, that the “work and notes” of non-testifying technicians who prepared a DNA profile were not testimonial.

unfair prejudice.” “Unfair prejudice results if the evidence has an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, such as emotion, sympathy, or horror.” ().

Moreover, “Williams is a plurality decision and has limited if any precedential value,” ¶ 52 (App. 2015), so it provides “no binding rule for determining when reports are testimonial.” ¶ 60 (2013).

¶ 71 (App. 2015) (addressing the principles underlying harmless-error review can overcome waiver).

We view “the evidence in the ‘light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.’” ¶ 5 (App. 2015) (citation omitted).

We view the expert’s testimony “in the ‘light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.’” ¶ 5 (App. 2015) (citation omitted).

See, (rejecting similar Confrontation Clause challenge where analyst “formed her own opinions, based on a type of data normally relied upon by experts in her field.”)

–35, ¶¶ 12–13 (App. 2015).

See, e.g. , State v. Ortiz , , ¶¶ 1, 24, (defendant convicted of sexual conduct with a minor; " 'flirtatious' text messages" to victim evidence of "grooming" for purposes of child abuse); State v. Villegas , , (conviction for luring minor for sexual exploitation arising from text mes

This Court views “the evidence in the ‘light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect[.]’” ¶ 5 (App. 2015) ( ¶ 21 (App. 1998)).

MacKinney, 231 Ariz. at 591, ¶ 20 (mixed question); ¶ 18 (App. 1998) (court decides issue when there is no factual dispute); ¶ 60 (App. 2015) (standard of review).

On appeal, we view the challenged evidence “in the light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” ¶ 5 (App. 2015) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).

In doing so, we view “the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” ¶ 5 (App. 2015).

¶ 5 (App. 2015) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).

¶24 P.3d 125 (App. 2015) P.3d 439 (App. 2014) to support her argument that the trial court erred in not requiring the jury to explicitly determine the amount of the benefit obtained in relation to the fraud count.

In reviewing a trial court’s admissibility ruling, we view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” ¶ 5 (App. 2015).

In deciding whether dangerousness is inherent in an offense, we "look to statutes defining [the] offense, the indictment, and 'whether "an element of the offense charged contains an allegation and requires proof" of dangerousness.'" ¶ 64 (App. 2015) ( ¶ 38 (App. 2013)).

We review a “trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” ¶ 5 (App. 2015) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).

1 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to affirming the jury’s verdicts.” ¶ 2 (App. 2015).