Cited by

We review for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision to deny “compulsory process [for] a witness claiming a privilege against self-incrimination.”

n.6 (App. 2005) (finding constitutional issues not raised in the superior court waived); ¶ 22 (App. 1999) (finding waiver of equal protection argument initially raised on appeal).

“The trial court is invested with considerable discretion to determine whether evidence is admissible,” and “[w]e will not disturb a court’s determination absent an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 18 (App. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

-46 (1997); see, ¶ 28 (App. 1999) (holding that prior-act evidence was prejudicial but not unduly so because it did not suggest a decision on an improper basis).

“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” ¶ 28, (citations and internal punctuation omitted).

“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” ¶ 28 (App. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

801(d)(1)(A); ¶ 21 (App. 1999) (explaining that a “jury may consider prior inconsistent statements as impeachment and as substantive evidence”).

¶ 31 (App. 1999) (“If the witness validly asserts his Fifth Amendment privilege by showing ‘a reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer,’ .

(“An appellate court will not find error on the ground that the defendant was shackled unless it is shown that the jury saw the shackles.”); ¶ 8, (to warrant mistrial, appellant 1 Brown does not challenge the use of restraints.

-73 ¶ 13, -09 (App. 1999) (issue waived when defendant initially questioned the use of shackles, but did not further object after switching to a concealed leg brace).

P., does not preserve objection to trial error); (same).

¶ 15, -46, -64 (1976); -89, -81 (1970).3 ¶13 Davis contends he was not required to object under the circumstanc

¶¶ 19-20 , , (“‘Opposing counsel must timely object to any erroneous or improper statements made during closing argument or waive his right to the objection, except for fundamental error.’ ”), , , (defendant forfeited argument by first raising it in motion for new trial).'

” (noting that when “several jurors inadvertently saw the defendant in custody while on the way to the courtroom” the relevant question was “whether the defendant was prejudiced by what the jury saw”); State v. Mills, 196 Ariz. 269, 272 ¶¶ 9-12, (finding no error in superior court’s refusal to grant a mistrial when defendant was twice seen by jurors in restraints outside courtroom because defendant had not established prejudice); see also State v. H

For a witness to properly invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, he must show a “reasonable ground to apprehend danger to [himself] from his being compelled to answer.” ¶ 31, (quoting United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1976)).

163 ¶ 37, -84 , -98 (1997); , 274-75 ¶ 24, -11 (App.1999).

See, ¶ 22 , (finding waiver of equal protection argument initially raised on appeal).