Cited by

(whether a defendant is chronic felony offender is for trial court to determine in exercise of its discretion and appellate court will “defer to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by the record and not clearly erroneous”)

¶ 2, STATE v. ELLIS Decision of the Court 306 (App. 2000).

We defer to the respondent judge’s factual findings if they “are supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.”

“We defer to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.” ¶ 9

However, evidence need not be suppressed when “the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has „become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.‟” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963), quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); (suppression required only when “causal connection exists between a constitutional violation and the government‟s obtaining of [the] evidence”); n.6, n.6 (2004) (applying federal excl

We “„defer to the trial court‟s factual findings that are supported by the record and [are] not clearly erroneous,‟” and we will overturn those findings “only if no substantial evidence supports them.” 10

¶¶ 27-28, (legal question whether Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applies to specific facts of case reviewed de novo); (due process claims reviewed de novo); (“We agree with the trial court that the identification in this case does not come within the ambit of Dessureault.”).

(when reviewing motion to suppress evidence, “[w]e defer to the trial court’s 7 factual findings that are supported by the record and not clearly erroneous”).

When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review only the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress, and we view it in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling

‘We defer to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.” ¶ 9

(“possible signs of alcohol impairment” included “slurred speech, a noticeable stagger while walking, and a sideways body sway”).

We will defer to those factual determinations, ¶ 9 , while reviewing de novo the conclusion that telephonic testimony is “necessary to further an important public policy.” Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 , 110 S.Ct.

We will defer to those factual determinations, ¶ 9 , while reviewing de novo the conclusion that telephonic testimony is "necessary to further an important public policy."

“We defer to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.”

See, e.g., Kunzler, 154 Ariz. at 568-70 , 744 P.2d at 669-71 ; , McNutt, 133 Ariz. at 7 , 648 P.2d at 122

P.3d 303 (App. 2000); see also In re U. S. Currency of $315,900.00, P.2d 351 (App. 1995) (constitutional questions reviewed de novo).