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interference with contract, “a plaintiff must show ‘the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; the interferer’s knowledge of the relationship or expectancy; intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.’” ¶ 32 (App. 2005) (quoting Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High Sch.

6 SHOEMAKE et al. v. ESTANCIA Decision of the Court ¶19 In Arizona, “[c]onversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.” ¶ 34 (App. 2005) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1)(1965)).

n.5, ¶ 15, n.5 (App. 2005) ( ).

We must read the agreements in a manner that gives meaning to both “stay” and “care.” ¶ 11 , (“[W]e must interpret a contract in a way that gives meaning to all its material terms and renders none superfluous.”).

-71, ¶ 28 , -02 (App. 2005) (customer list was not trade secret when employer gave it to former employee and did not condition its use); Enterprise Leasing Co., 197 Ariz. at 150, ¶¶ 22-23 , 3 P.3d at 1070 (while employer does not relinquish trade secret by disclosure to employees on a necessary ba

& n.5, & n.5 (App. 2008); n.2, n.2 (App. 2005).

Indeed, Arizona courts have held that a business “competitor does not act improperly if [its] purpose at least in part is to advance [its] own economic interests.” , 471 ¶ 32, (quoting Bar J Bar, 158 Ariz. at 485 , 763 P.2d at 549 ); see also The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 (1979).

a claim for tortious interference must allege “‘the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; the interferer’s knowledge of the relationship or expectancy; intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.’” quoting Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High Sch.

A successor in interest retains the same rights as the original owner, with no change in substance.’” n.7, n.7 (App. 2005), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1473 (8th ed. 2004) (brackets in Miller); see also A.R.

Arizona follows the definition of conversion set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1) (1965): “Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.” ¶ 34 , see also Focal Point