Cited by

¶ 33 (App. 2005) (holding that there is an elevated “need for caution” in finding liability for tortious interference when there is only an expectation that 6 DREAM v. SANTOS, et al. Decision of the Court customers “wo

tiff must allege “an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which 5 STEPHAN v. BERTZ, et al. Decision of the Court so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.” ¶ 34 (App. 2005) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1) (1965)).

Although it is not improper for a competitor to advance their own economic interest, ¶ 32 (App. 2005) (citing Bar J Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Restatement”) § 768 (1979)), Appellees miss the mark.

“An action for conversion ordinarily lies only for personal property that is tangible, or to intangible property that is merged in, or identified with, some document.” ¶ 35 (App. 2005) (citation omitted).

¶32 “‘When interpreting an agreement, the court may always consider the surrounding circumstances’ and ‘the context in which it was made.’” ¶ 12 (App. 2005).

a, we have expressly held that claims may involve “intangible property that is merged in, or identified with, some document,” such as “a stock certificate or an insurance policy,” ¶ 35 (App. 2005).

Comm’n of Arizona, (“[A] sole proprietor and the business are one legal entity.”); ¶¶ 17–18 (App. 2005) (explaining, “a sole proprietorship using a fictitious name does not have a separate legal existence from the individual business owner,” which “protects parties who interact with a sole proprietorship by ensuring that the individual business owner does not obtain a de facto form of limited

“Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.” ¶ 34 (App. 2005) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1) (1965)).

¶ 34 (App. 2005) (“Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.”).

¶ 32 (App. 2005) (quoting Bar J Bar, 158 Ariz. at 485); see Safeway Ins., 210 Ariz. at 12, ¶ 23 (rejecting argument "that lawyers have an improper motive simply because they seek to increase their fees by maximizing an award for a client").

Amfac holds that actual injury is required for negligence claims, id., while conversion is an intentional tort, ¶ 37 (App. 2005).

¶13 “When interpreting an agreement, the court may always consider the surrounding circumstances and ‘the context in which it was made.’” ¶ 12 (App. 2005) (quoting Smith v. Melson, Inc., ).

¶ 12 (App. 2005) ("[C]ourts are not constrained by textual omissions to abandon common sense and experience or to ignore the surrounding circumstances of an agreement.").

of Governors, ); ¶ 14 (App. 2007) (business expectancy) ( ¶ 32 (App. 2005)).

¶ 34 (App. 2005) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1) (1965)).

Contract terms are to be considered “in view of the surrounding circumstances,” and courts are not “to abandon common sense and experience or to ignore the surrounding circumstances of an agreement.” ¶ 12 (App. 2005) (citations and quotations omitted); accord AZTAR Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins.