Cited by

¶ 12 (App. 2005); see also Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 309 (“[A]ffidavits that contain inadmissible evidence, that are internally inconsistent, that tend to contradict the affiant’s sworn testimony at deposition, and similar items of evidence may provide a ‘scintilla’ or create the ‘slightest doubt’ and still be ins

We accept jurisdiction here because a party usually has no right to direct appeal or post-judgment review of an order denying summary judgment, ¶ 5 (App. 2005), and a party who claims immunity loses its benefit if forced to stand trial, ¶ 14 (App. 2014); see Ariz. R.P.

A genuine factual dispute “is one that a reasonable trier of fact could decide in favor of the party adverse to summary judgment on the available evidentiary record.” Modular Mining Sys., Inc. v. Jigsaw Techs., Inc., ¶ 15 (App. 2009) ( ¶ 15 (App. 2005)).

¶ 12 (App. 2005) (“[a] 5 BAIKER v. KAPLAN Decision of the Court ‘genuine’ issue is one that a reasonable trier of fact could decide in favor of the party adverse to summary judgment on the available evidentiary r

¶ 12 (App. 2005) (“[a] ‘genuine’ issue is one that a reasonable trier of fact could decide in favor of the party adverse to 5 WILTSE v. WILTSE Decision of the Court summary judgment on the available evidentiary re

“A ‘genuine’ issue is one that a reasonable trier of fact could decide in favor of the party adverse to summary judgment on the available evidentiary record.” ¶ 12 (App. 2005).

See generally United States v. Sanchez, 639 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011)

“A ‘genuine’ issue is one that a reasonable trier of fact could decide in favor of the party adverse to summary judgment on the available evidentiary record.”

“We, therefore, do not consider this issue on appeal.” 6 , (App. *229 sion from a proven fact o[r] facts.’ ”

b (1965); n.1, n.1 (App. 2005) (recognizing that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965) “sets forth a ‘negligent entrustment’ claim”); (recognizing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 307 (1965) as basis for negligent entrustment claim)

Section 390 of the Restatement (Second) specifically requires the entrustor of a chattel to consider the characteristics of the entrustee, such as “youth, inexperience, or otherwise” in evaluating whether the latter might use the chattel in a manner that would pose “an unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others.” n.1, n.1 (App. 2005) (equating § 390 with negligent entrustment in Arizona).