Cited by

¶19 To the contrary, Arizona courts have analyzed medical malpractice occurring at hospitals in terms of (1) the relationship between the physician and the patient, (no doctor-patient relationship between examining physician and claimant in worker’s compensation case); Diggs v. Ariz. Cardiologists, Ltd., ¶ 27 (App. 2000) (doctor-patient relationship exists between a consulting radiologist and a patient)

SERVS., LLC Opinion of the Court actions raised by patients against their healthcare providers); see, (common law duty created by physician-patient relationship where physician provides treatment to patient); Stanley, ¶¶ 10-11, 13 (implicitly acknowledging that “traditional doctor-patient relationship” would create duty); see also § 13-3620(A) (creating statutory obligation for physicia

(“We do not understand the law to be that one owes a duty of reasonable care at all times to all people under all circumstances.”).

Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 356; (“One who engages in negligent conduct is not 28 QUIROZ V. ALCOA Opinion of the Court automatically subject to potential legal liability.

(“We do not understand the law to be that one owes a duty of reasonable care at all times to all people under all circumstances.”).

229 Ariz. at 338 ¶ 18, , (“We do not understand the law to be that one owes a duty of reasonable care at all times to all people under all circumstances.

ility in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.”); ¶ 17 , (“We do not understand the law to be that one owes a duty of reasonable care at all times to all people under all circumstances.”) ( , ); Bloxham, 203 Ariz. at 275, ¶ 8 , 53 P.3d at 200 (same).

(rejecting argument that duty should be based on professional standards described by plaintiffs expert instead of legal requirements); L.A.

(expert witness may not create duty through opinion when law does not recognize such duty).

(expert witness may not create duty through opinion when law does not recognize such duty).

*146 ¶ 24 Kasey argues that recognizing a duty here would imply that all people owe a duty of care to all others at all times, a , 426 ¶ 17, (“We do not understand the law to be that one owes a duty of reasonable care at all times to all people under all circumstances.” ( , )), , 275 ¶ 8, (same).

(“We do not understand the law to be that one owes a duty of reasonable care at all times to all people under all circumstances.”).

¶4 MCC declared bankruptcy and was dismissed from the action, and the trial court, , granted summary judgment to Dr. McCarver and dismissed ONC from the ease.

1 The superior court, , granted Dr. McCarver summary judgment because he “did not offer or intend to treat, care for or otherwise benefit the employee” and therefore lacked the requisite physician-patient relationship with Stanley.

“We do not understand the law to be that one owes a duty of reasonable care at all times to all people under all circumstances.”

Exception to Privilege for IME ¶ 28 , the state lastly contends the privilege is unavailable to Wilson because Krasner saw him for an IME, not as a treating physician.

¶ 9 , decided as a matter of law that Dr. Valdez did not owe a duty to Mrs. Diggs.

(“Although standards for experts’ qualifications and admissibility of their opinions have been stretched considerably, we have not yet reached the point when experts can dictate the law.”).

a case that the trial court dismissed as too broad and distinguishable from this case.

a case that the trial court dismissed as too broad and distinguishable from this case.