Cited by

–89, ¶¶ 9–14 (App. 2002) (justification defenses defined in Title 13 cannot be cross applied across statutory schemes).

¶ 11 (App. 2002); accord Bayardi, 230 Ariz. at 200, ¶ 19.

Rios further contends that § 13- 2921 is ambiguous and that we must thus resolve the ambiguity “under the rule of lenity, in [his] favor.” (“[R]ule [of lenity] applies when a statute is ambiguous and dictates that any doubt about statutory construction be resolved in favor of a defendant.”).

Only then may we consider other factors, including a statute’s “context, history, subject matter, effects and consequences, spirit, and purpose.” George, 206 Ariz. at 440, ¶ 6 ( ¶ 6 (App. 2002)); accord Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel.

Taylor v. Cruikshank , , ¶ 10, (quoting State v. Fell , , ¶ 6, ).

§ 13-401(B); ¶ 1 (App. 2002) (the necessity defense does not apply to criminal offenses defined outside Title 13).

(rule of lenity not applicable to unambiguous statute).

notices sent pursuant to § 34-223(A) of the LMA, we apply the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, an established rule of statutory construction meaning “‘the expression of one or more items of a class indicates an intent to exclude all items of the same class which are not expressed.’” -91 (App. 2003), CEMEX v. FALCONE BROS. & ASSOCS., INC. Opinion of the Court 218, 221 (App. 2002).

2 STATE v. ESCALANTE Decision of the Court ¶4 This court’s P.3d 218 (App. 2002) (review denied Feb.

¶ 13 , (“[T]he legislature has not seen fit to extend [Chapter 4] justification defenses, including the necessity defense, to Title 28 offenses.”).

arising from a single, combined attack committed by two assailants.” He maintains “the principle of [ljenity would apply to [his] situation and double jeopardy would be a bar to two convictions.” The rule of lenity “dictates that any doubt about statutory construction be resolved in favor of a defendant,” , and thus “ ‘against taming a single transaction into multiple offenses,’ ” ,- quoting State v. Arndt, 87 Wash.2d 374 , , (App

¶3 In construing statutes, “our primary goal is to discern and give effect to the legislature‟s intent.”

“We resort to additional considerations ‘such as the statute’s context, history, subject matter, effects and consequences, spirit, and purpose’ only if the language proves to be ambiguous.”

¶ 16 In interpreting statutes, “our primary goal is to discern and give effect to the legislature’s intent.”

The rule of lenity “dictates that any doubt about statutory construction be resolved in favor of a defendant,” , and thus “‘against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.’” , quoting Arndt, 553 P.2d at 1334 .

and ‘aim to achieve consistency among them’ within the context of the overall statutory scheme.” ¶ 6 , (quoting Bills v. Ariz. Prop.

Where, as here, the statute’s plain language is unclear, we consider “factors such as the statute’s context, history, subject matter, effects and consequences, spirit, and purpose.” ¶ 6

see also Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65, 100 S. Ct. at 920-21 (lenity principle’s “touchstone .

If a statute’s language is unclear, we “‘consider other factors such as the statute’s context, history, subject matter, effects and consequences, spirit, and purpose.’”