Cited by

(“[I]t is the universal rule that if improper statements are made by counsel during the trial it is the duty of opposing counsel to register an objection thereto so that the court may make a correction by proper instruction and, if the offense be sufficiently hurtful, declare a mistrial.”) (citation omitte

That said, counsel is given “wide latitude” in offering closing argument, –37 (1970), impeaching witnesses on cross-examination, and presenting “fair rebuttal to areas opened by the defense,”

¶14 Counsel must not "comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury," or "bolster a witness's credibility by reference to matters outside the record," ¶ 75 (2018).

¶33 Counsel is given “wide latitude in presenting closing arguments to the jury” because they “are permitted to comment on the evidence already introduced and to argue reasonable inferences therefrom.” –37 (1970).

(“attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury” during closing arguments).

See, (finding the prosecutor’s remarks that defense counsel was talking “out of two sides of his mouth” and referring to him as a “poor, humble, simple little fellow who was playing games with the jury” were improper).

¶18 Although a prosecutor should not impugn opposing counsel’s “integrity or honesty” during closing arguments, Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 86, ¶ 59, we do not find that the prosecutor’s “snidely” comment here fell beyond the scope of permissible argument, (“[E]xcessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before

¶ 37 (2000) (“[E]xcessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury.”) ().

-37, -91 (1970); (concluding that the following comments made by prosecutor regarding his previous service on the bench were not improper: “You know, this presumption of innocence is great.

¶ 33 (Utah App. 2014) (noting that “colloquial, vigorous, and colorful comments often fall within the wide latitude permitted counsel in presenting closing arguments to the jury”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); -37, -91 (1970) (“Our law 8 STATE v. CAHILL Decision of the Court permits trial counsel wide latitude in presenting closing arguments to the jury.”).

(noting closing arguments are not evidence, and “counsel are permitted to comment on the evidence already introduced and to argue reasonable inferences therefrom”) ( ).

Even assuming Appellant’s assertion is correct, closing arguments are not evidence, (citation omitted), and the jury was specifically instructed that the closing arguments, and any opinions given by the attorneys therein, did not constitute evidence.

“[E]xcessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury.” ¶ 37, ( ).

-37 , -91 (1970) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion for mistrial based on prosecutor’s accusing defense counsel of talking with a “forked tongue”).

Furthermore, prosecutors have wide latitude in presenting their closing arguments to the jury: “excessive and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously been offered and placed before the jury.” -37 , -91 (1970).