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United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980); ¶ 7 (App. 1999) ("It is well established, however, that confrontation rights do not apply to the same extent at a pretrial suppression hearing as they do at trial.").

¶ 8 (App. 1999); –36 (App. 1982).

¶¶ 6-7 (App. 1999) (holding that confrontation rights do not apply to the same extent at a pretrial suppression hearing as they do at trial); Ariz. R. Evid.

¶ 15 (App. 1999) (considering a suspect's nervousness and responses to questions in finding an officer had reasonable suspicion).

The Confrontation Clause does not apply to the same extent at pretrial hearings as it does at trial, ¶ 7 (App. 1999); see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”) and the right to confront one’s accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude to question the witnesses at trial, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987).

See State v. Riley , , ¶ 21, , 1142 (App. 1999) (prohibition against double punishment "does not apply to sentences imposed for a single act that harms multiple victims").

2 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts.” ¶ 2 (App. 2005) ( ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).

[a]nd as you can see it’s stained on the front.” The trial 1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict[].” ¶ 2 (App. 2005) ( ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).

The testimony was not offered to show that because Jensen possessed a characteristic common among DUI suspects, he was guilty of DUI; rather, it was offered to show he initially minimized his level Riley, ¶¶ 6-7, (holding that confrontation rights do not apply to the same extent at a pretrial suppression hearing as they do at trial); Ariz. R. Evid.

Furthermore, Padilla pleaded guilty to engaging in sexual contact 10 STATE v. PADILLA Decision of the Court with two different victims; thus, consecutive sentences were entirely proper.7 See, –47, ¶ 21, – 42 (App. 1999) (affirming consecutive sentences for offenses committed against multiple victims).

By 1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict[].” ¶ 2 (App. 2005) ( ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).

After observing that the signature on the check did not match 1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts.” ¶ 2 (App. 2005) ( ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).

on the forehead with his gun, 1 “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts.” ¶ 2, ( ¶ 2, ).

2“We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions, with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” ¶ 2, ( ).

§ 13-116 „does not apply to sentences imposed for a single act that harms multiple victims.‟” n.4, n.4 (App. 2005), (interpreting predecessor statute).

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, State v. O’Meara, P.3d 325 (2000), P.2d 1135 (App. 1999), involved reasonable suspicion grounded in cumulative information that had been gathered from an extended period of observation or investigation and/or based on a clear-cut violation of traffic laws.2 1 Fornof relies primarily on United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613 (4t