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“A denial of a motion for new trial will be reversed only when there is an affirmative showing that the trial court abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily.”

Scheehle, 211 Ariz. at 293-94, 300-01 & 301; -43 (1984) (affirming denial of defendant’s motion for change of judge for cause where judge had voluntarily recused from sentencing, refused to recuse from motion for new trial, and then withdrew voluntary recusal after reading defendant’s motion).

“A denial of a motion for new trial will be reversed only when there is an affirmative showing that the trial court abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily.”

"As a general rule, 'sentencing is the responsibility of the trial judge and, absent an abuse of discretion, the sentence will not be altered.'" ().

(“A Rule 20 motion is designed to test the sufficiency of the state’s evidence.”); -33 (1984) (noting the similarity of Rule 20 and Rule 24.1 standards and deciding issues regarding sufficiency and the weight of the evidence without separate analyses); ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for new trial base

(explaining that evidence of premeditation was admissible when defendant was retried solely for second-degree murder after his first-degree murder conviction was vacated).

We have held that the privilege protects “[a]ll information obtained by the physician, whether from examination, testing, or direct communication,” and, although framed as a testimonial privilege, the privilege also protects patient medical records, see Tucson Med.

" State v. Fillmore , , 184, , 1313 (App. 1996), quoting State v. Mincey , , 445, , 1200 (1984).

In reviewing Snethen’s noted challenges, we view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts, ¶ 2 (App. 2007), and resolve all reasonable inferences against Snethen

(privilege protects "[a]ll information obtained by the physician, whether from examination, testing, or direct communication").5 ¶17 "The purpose of the [physician-patient] privilege is to encourage 'full and frank disclosure of medical history and symptoms by a patient to [her] doctor.'" Phoen

(“A Rule 20 motion is designed to test the sufficiency of the state’s evidence.”); –33 (1984) (noting similarity of Rule 20 and Rule 24.1 standards and deciding issues regarding sufficiency and weight of evidence without separate analyses); ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (holding no error in denying motion for new trial based on claim that verdict was against “the weight of th

(difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion).

¶17 “A denial of a motion for new trial will be reversed only when there is an affirmative showing that the trial court abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily.”

¶ 7 “A denial of a motion for new trial will be reversed only when there is an affirmative showing that the trial court abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily.”

On review, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant.”

[Therefore], once waived, whether at a former trial or otherwise, [the defendant] cannot reassert his or her privilege.” (physician-patient privilege); see also 1 Joseph M. Livermore, Robert Bartels & Anne Holt Hameroff, Arizona Practice: Law of Evidence § 501.1, at 124 (4th ed. 2000) (“Once a privilege has been waived, and confidentiality lost, it may not be reass