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Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Soto, 572 P.2d 1183.

41 citing documents.

  • State v. Lopez-Cubas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    (holding that a nine-month delay was “sufficient to trigger further examination of the other factors”).
  • State v. Whiteside Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • State v. Whiteside Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    The Arizona Supreme Court has found a pretrial delay of nine months sufficient to trigger further 10 STATE v. WHITESIDE Decision of the Court examination under the state constitution, and contemplated, without deciding, that a 7.5 months’ delay may “require further examination,”
  • State v. Dobbins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • State v. Dobbins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    ¶17 Because the length of delay between Dobbins’ indictment and the trial was about ten months, we must examine each of the Barker factors.1 See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (post-indictment delay approaching a year is unreasonable enough to trigger additional analysis); (noting a nine-month delay is enough to trigger examination of other factors).
  • State v. Gwen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Gwen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)).
  • State v. Torrance Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Torrance Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1; -37, ¶ 8 (2013); (finding a nine-month delay sufficient to conduct the full Barker analysis).
  • State v. Cota Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Cota Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    Spreitz, 190 Ariz. at 140 (“While five years in custody may have increased defendant’s anxiety quotient, we find .
  • State v. Sales Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Sales Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    (concluding that the defendant’s and his family’s anxieties are not sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal).
  • State v. Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).
  • State of Arizona v. William Craig Miller 316 P.3d 1219 Ariz. 2013
  • State of Arizona v. William Craig Miller 316 P.3d 1219 Ariz. 2013
    (calling prejudice the most important factor).
  • Steven Lane Fuller v. State of Arizona 314 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
  • Steven Lane Fuller v. State of Arizona 314 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
    (discussing Sixth Amendment speedy trial standard).
  • State of Arizona v. Steven John Parker 296 P.3d 54 Ariz. 2013
  • State of Arizona v. Steven John Parker 296 P.3d 54 Ariz. 2013
    State v. Soto, 117 Ariz. 345, 348
  • State v. Sanchez 747 P.2d 1243 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
  • State v. Sanchez 747 P.2d 1243 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
    as support for this contention.
  • McCutcheon v. SUPERIOR COURT OF STATE 723 P.2d 661 Ariz. 1986
  • McCutcheon v. SUPERIOR COURT OF STATE 723 P.2d 661 Ariz. 1986
    (nine month delay triggered analysis); U.S. v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850 (10th Cir.1983) (sixteen month delay triggered analysis).
  • State v. Leslie 708 P.2d 719 Ariz. 1985
  • State v. Leslie 708 P.2d 719 Ariz. 1985
  • State v. Zuck 658 P.2d 162 Ariz. 1982
  • State v. Zuck 658 P.2d 162 Ariz. 1982
    we held that nine months’ delay was enough to trigger further examination, but was not prejudicial per se.
  • State v. Agnew 647 P.2d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
  • State v. Agnew 647 P.2d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
    2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)
  • State v. Brooks 618 P.2d 624 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
  • State v. Brooks 618 P.2d 624 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
    (where a nine month delay was upheld)
  • State v. Gretzler 612 P.2d 1023 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Gretzler 612 P.2d 1023 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Vaughan 602 P.2d 831 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
  • State v. Vaughan 602 P.2d 831 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
    Nor has he established a violation of his constitutional right to a
  • State v. Edwards 594 P.2d 72 Ariz. 1979
  • State v. Edwards 594 P.2d 72 Ariz. 1979
    Finding that no violation had occurred to that point, and noting that the speedy-trial limits begin again following reindictment, , and since Edwards alleges no subsequent speedy-trial violation unless the earlier period is included, we find that rule 8 was not violated.
  • State v. Sustaita 583 P.2d 239 Ariz. 1978
  • State v. Sustaita 583 P.2d 239 Ariz. 1978