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If “the trial judge determines that a witness could legitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant questions, then that witness may be totally excused without violating an individual’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process.”

But “[c]ounsel is given ‘wide latitude’ in closing argument to ‘comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences’ from it.” ¶ 180 (2004) ().

(explaining the 3 STATE v. QUINTERO Decision of the Court burden of proof requires defendant to present evidence of a provable reality, not mere speculation).

(“It is well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise 3 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person .

See State v. Bussdieker, 127 Ariz. 8 STATE v. RICCI Decision of the Court 339, 342 (1980)

P. 33.7(e) (“The defendant must attach to the petition any affidavits, records, or other evidence currently available to the defendant supporting the allegations in the petition.”); (claimant bears burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel and we do not address it.

(“It is well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.”)

n.2 (1983) (adverse inference may not be argued from party’s failure to call a witness who “can be physically produced but cannot be compelled to testify”); (“It is well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.”).

¶23 In criminal cases, counsel is given “wide latitude” in closing argument, and may “comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences therefrom.”

It is, however, “well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.” (citations omitted); (“The decision to permit counsel to call a witness who has indicated he or she will refuse to testify is ordinarily discretionary with the trial court, which

Ineffective assistance of counsel “must be a demonstrable reality rather than a matter of speculation.”

¶11 Additionally, Reyes cannot establish prejudice because the 9.25-year sentence would have fallen within the range of the original offer, and determining what sentence he might have received if he had accepted that offer is speculative at best.2 (stating that proof of counsel’s ineffectiveness “must be a demonstrable reality rather than a matter of speculation”), abrogation 2 Reyes contends he would not have received more than 9.25 years under the range anyway, without a jury trial on the aggr

(trial court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing based on generalized and unsubstantiated claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); (ineffective assistance of counsel must be a demonstrable reality rather than a matter of speculation), (defendant’s self-serving assertions in affidavit are generally insufficient to raise a

-94, -40 (1989) (Feldman, J., concurring).

overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct.

at 587 n.2 (citing 1 M. Udall & J. Livermore, Arizona Practice, Law of Evidence § 125, at 257 (2d ed. 1982)); (“It is well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.”) (citations omitted).

“Conviction of a felony is material to a witness’s credibility.”

When asked, counsel told the court, “the only reason I brought [Dr. Solomon] in is because these two [defendants] named her as a non-party at fault.” ¶ 54 Courts give counsel “ ‘wide latitude’ in closing arguments to ‘comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences’ from it.” ¶ 180 , ( , ( , *304 (1989))).

5 ¶9 As our supreme court has explained, “Generally, ‘[t]he [S]tate cannot be held to disclose material that it does not possess.’” (alterations in Armstrong).

ocaine intoxication where the expert “had no basis upon which to render an opinion about the effects of crack cocaine use at the time of the murder”); , (stating that “[t]estimony concerning intoxication should be limited to the time of the crime for which the defendant is being tried”)