Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Reinhold, 597 P.2d 532.

50 citing documents.

  • State of Arizona v. Giovani Fuster Melendez 565 P.3d 1034 Ariz. 2025
  • State of Arizona v. Giovani Fuster Melendez 565 P.3d 1034 Ariz. 2025
    emain silent as to others,” the state was permitted to comment on the defendant’s silence because he “never invoked his right to remain silent”; “[b]ecause defendant 16 STATE V. MELENDEZ Opinion of the Court did not invoke his right to remain silent, there is no Doyle violation”); (explaining that reference to the defendant’s selective silence did not violate Doyle because the defendant “did not invoke his right to remain silent”).
  • State v. Baca Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • State v. Baca Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    But because the trial court is in the best position to determine an impaneled juror’s fairness and impartiality, a defendant “challenging the juror bears the burden of establishing” the juror’s bias or discrimination, ¶ 37 (2000).
  • State v. Melendez 535 P.3d 16 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • State v. Melendez 535 P.3d 16 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • State v. Robinson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Robinson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    do not fit the facts.”) ( n.4, n.4 (1979)).
  • Empress Adult Video & Bookstore v. City of Tucson 59 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
  • Empress Adult Video & Bookstore v. City of Tucson 59 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
    (deference accorded recent Washington cases interpreting identical provision of its state constitution); , (opinions of Washington Supreme Court peculiarly persuasive when our constitutional provision obviously copied from that state’s
  • Clouse Ex Rel. Clouse v. State 16 P.3d 757 Ariz. 2001
  • Clouse Ex Rel. Clouse v. State 16 P.3d 757 Ariz. 2001
    ("While the opinion from the Supreme Court of Washington is not controlling, it is peculiarly persuasive both by reason of its sound reasoning as well as the fact that our constitutional provision on eminent domain was obviously copied from the constitution of that state.”); , (construing article VI, section 27, of the Arizona Constitution and according deference to recent cases from the State of Washington interpreting an identical provision of its state constitution); -72 , (construing article
  • Clouse v. State 11 P.3d 1012 Ariz. 2000
  • Clouse v. State 11 P.3d 1012 Ariz. 2000
    ("While the opinion from the Supreme Court of Washington is not controlling, it is peculiarly persuasive both by reason of its sound reasoning as well as the fact that our constitutional provision on eminent domain was obviously copied from the constitution of that state.”); , (construing article VI, section 27, of the Arizona Constitution and according deference to recent cases from the State of Washington interpreting an identical provision of its state constitution); -72 , (construing article
  • State v. Cartwright 746 P.2d 478 Ariz. 1987
  • State v. Cartwright 746 P.2d 478 Ariz. 1987
    (construing similar predecessor statute).
  • State v. Webb 717 P.2d 462 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
  • State v. Webb 717 P.2d 462 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
  • State v. Cocio 709 P.2d 1336 Ariz. 1985
  • State v. Cocio 709 P.2d 1336 Ariz. 1985
  • State v. Sparks 708 P.2d 732 Ariz. 1985
  • State v. Sparks 708 P.2d 732 Ariz. 1985
  • State v. Kerr 690 P.2d 145 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • State v. Kerr 690 P.2d 145 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • State v. Garcia 688 P.2d 206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • State v. Garcia 688 P.2d 206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • State v. Starcevich 678 P.2d 959 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
  • State v. Starcevich 678 P.2d 959 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
  • State v. McCall 677 P.2d 920 Ariz. 1983
  • State v. McCall 677 P.2d 920 Ariz. 1983
  • State v. Bolt 689 P.2d 543 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
  • State v. Bolt 689 P.2d 543 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
  • State v. Lambright 673 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1983
  • State v. Lambright 673 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1983
  • State v. Routhier 669 P.2d 68 Ariz. 1983
  • State v. Routhier 669 P.2d 68 Ariz. 1983
    Appellant’s express invocation of his rights, as well as his failure to make a complete statement or to answer particular questions, distinguishes this case from
  • State v. Axley 646 P.2d 268 Ariz. 1982
  • State v. Axley 646 P.2d 268 Ariz. 1982
    57-58 n. 4, , 539-40 n. 4 (1979).
  • State v. Brokaw 658 P.2d 185 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
  • State v. Brokaw 658 P.2d 185 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
  • State v. Williams 644 P.2d 889 Ariz. 1982
  • State v. Williams 644 P.2d 889 Ariz. 1982
  • State v. Rodriguez 641 P.2d 888 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1981
  • State v. Rodriguez 641 P.2d 888 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1981
    Although the trial court’s determination of a challenge for cause is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion, , we believe the ruling here was such an abuse.
  • State v. Munson 631 P.2d 1099 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1981
  • State v. Munson 631 P.2d 1099 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1981
  • State v. Grier 630 P.2d 575 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
  • State v. Grier 630 P.2d 575 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
    Next, appellant argues that because evidence which shows that a defendant has committed other crimes is generally inadmissible, , the Mesa police officer should not have been allowed to testify that she recognized the composite drawing as being appellant.
  • State v. Watkins 614 P.2d 835 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Watkins 614 P.2d 835 Ariz. 1980