Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Ortiz, 639 P.2d 1020.

118 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Edward Littleton McCauley Ariz. 2026
State v. Abbott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Abbott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
at 545, (“When an indictment charges a single conspiracy with multiple objects, a conviction will stand if the prosecution proves the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit any one of the objects.”).
State of Arizona v. Michael Jonathon Carlson 351 P.3d 1079 Ariz. 2015
State of Arizona v. Michael Jonathon Carlson 351 P.3d 1079 Ariz. 2015
¶¶ 5–7, (interpreting 2001 version of statute); –39 ¶¶ 56–57, – 60 (2002); State v. (Robert G.) Jones, ¶ 64, n.2, n.2 (1983); –11, –36 (1981).
State v. Freeney 207 P.3d 688 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. McGill 140 P.3d 930 Ariz. 2006
State v. McGill 140 P.3d 930 Ariz. 2006
-09 , -34 (1981), , 57 n. 2, , 16 n. 2 (1983).
State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
- 34 - 206, overruled, in part, n.2, n.2 (1983).
State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
State v. Gatliff 102 P.3d 981 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Gatliff 102 P.3d 981 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
we held that fire falls within the statutory definition of “dangerous instrument.” , 198 n. 1, , 1023 n. 1 (1981) , (“The jury also found that these crimes involved the use or exhibition of fire, a dangerous instrument under A.R.S.
State v. Tucker 68 P.3d 110 Ariz. 2003
State v. Tucker 68 P.3d 110 Ariz. 2003
See, , (setting fire to an inmate in his cell, thus endangering nearby inmates trapped in them cells); , (shooting victims in a crowded bar); , (setting fire to the victim’s house while her children were inside); , (shooting a victim in a crowded gymnasium).
Evanchyk v. Stewart 47 P.3d 1114 Ariz. 2002
Evanchyk v. Stewart 47 P.3d 1114 Ariz. 2002
We have therefore held that the state must prove that the defendant had the “intent to promote the offense of murder and an agreement with another that one will do the actual killing.” P.2d 1 (1983).
State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
-53 , -13 (1993), , 63-64 n. 7, , 1011-12 n. 7 ¶¶ 28-30 (1998); -16 , -61 (1983); -08 , -33 (1981), , 57 n. 2, , 16 n. 2 (1983).
State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
-53, -13 (1993), - 64 n.7, -12 n.7 ¶¶28-30 (1998); -16, -61 (1983); -08, -33 (1981), n.2, n.2 (1983).
State v. Estrada 18 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
State v. Estrada 18 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
¶ 5 Petitioner’s , , which address the due process requirement that the state give sufficient advance notice of the aggravating factors it intends to prove at sentencing to enable a defendant to prepare a rebuttal, is misplaced.
State v. Doerr 969 P.2d 1168 Ariz. 1998
State v. Doerr 969 P.2d 1168 Ariz. 1998
see also United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir.1972); Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640 , 26 S.Ct.
State v. Rienhardt 951 P.2d 454 Ariz. 1997
State v. Rienhardt 951 P.2d 454 Ariz. 1997
State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1204 Ariz. 1997
State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1204 Ariz. 1997
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
State v. Mata 916 P.2d 1035 Ariz. 1996
State v. Mata 916 P.2d 1035 Ariz. 1996
2960 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 ] has approved of ‘strikingly similar terms’ in another state’s capital sentencing statute.” 135 Ariz. at 50 , 659 P.2d at 9 (“We believe that the statutory phrase ‘especially heinous, cruel or depraved’ has been construed in a constitutionally nar *324 row fashion, and has been properly applied in individual cases.”) ( , cert.
Ah v. Super. Ct. in and for Mohave Cty. 911 P.2d 633 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
A.H. v. Superior Court 911 P.2d 633 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
A.H. v. Superior Court 911 P.2d 633 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
THE VICTIMS’ BILL OF RIGHTS DOES NOT ALLOW A VICTIM TO REFUSE TO TESTIFY AT A PRESENTENCE HEARING Although a defendant does not have a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his accusers at the sentencing stage, , cert.
Ah v. Super. Ct. in and for Mohave Cty. 911 P.2d 633 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
THE VICTIMS' BILL OF RIGHTS DOES NOT ALLOW A VICTIM TO REFUSE TO TESTIFY AT A PRESENTENCE HEARING Although a defendant does not have a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his accusers at the sentencing stage, , cert.
State v. Walden 905 P.2d 974 Ariz. 1995
State v. Walden 905 P.2d 974 Ariz. 1995
State v. Willoughby 892 P.2d 1319 Ariz. 1995
State v. Willoughby 892 P.2d 1319 Ariz. 1995
(“When an indictment charges a single conspiracy with multiple objects, a conviction will stand if the prosecution proves the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit any one of the objects.”), cert.
State v. Scott 865 P.2d 792 Ariz. 1993
State v. Scott 865 P.2d 792 Ariz. 1993
Even before the recent rule amendment, see note 4 below, case law required the state to disclose the aggravating factors it would seek to prove, and the evidence upon which it would rely, and to make such disclosure “suf *142 ficiently in advance of the hearing that the defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to prepare rebuttal.” , cert.
State v. Michael Apelt 861 P.2d 634 Ariz. 1993
State v. Michael Apelt 861 P.2d 634 Ariz. 1993
(defendant only entitled to such notice “sufficiently in advance of the [sentencing] hearing that the defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to prepare rebuttal”), cert.
State v. West 862 P.2d 192 Ariz. 1993
State v. West 862 P.2d 192 Ariz. 1993
Instead, due process requires only that the prosecution disclose aggravating circumstances “sufficiently in advance of the hearing that the defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to prepare rebuttal.” , cert.
State v. Bible 858 P.2d 1152 Ariz. 1993
State v. Bible 858 P.2d 1152 Ariz. 1993
3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); , cert.