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It merely defines a single harsh punishment for a single severe crime.” (“reaffirming the rule of Bly”).

Nothing in either of those cases conflicts with or undermines the well-established rule that when, as here, “the presumptive sentence is imposed, no findings as to aggravation or mitigation are required.” ().

In any event, “the fixing of prison terms for specific crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.” Berger, 212 Ariz. at 483 ¶ 50 (citation omitted); (“Unless the punishment is so severe as to be disproportionate to the crime .

¶25 Godoy contends we should distinguish his case from our supreme court’s

–73 (1980); ¶ 23 (App. 2015).

(“[T]he potential for serious bodily injury or loss 6 STATE v. HON.

363 ¶ 15, (superseded by statute, A.R.S.

¶ 15, (superseded by statute, A.R.S.

at 606, 760 P.2d at 606, and the United States Supreme Court and Arizona Supreme Court have found that sentence enhancements do not violate double jeopardy, ¶ 23, (citing United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154– 55 (1997)); -72, -81 (1980), superseded by statute, A.R.S.

¶ 23, (citing United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154–55 (1997)); superseded by statute, A.R.S.

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1997); superseded by statute, A.R.S.

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 (1974).4 ¶10 Finally, this is not a case where Coulter received an aggravated sentence based on “‘[a]ny other factors which the court may deem appropriate to the ends of justice.’” 4 Coulter claims such a reading of the statute would “run afoul of Arizona’s ‘complex, multi-step sentencing scheme,’ under which the presumptive sentence ‘is to be imposed on the vast majority of first offenders who commit the crime.’” Here, however, the Legislature authorized the su

4 STATE v. WIGGINS Decision of the Court ¶9 Wiggins agues such an interpretation runs afoul of the Legislature’s intent, that the presumptive sentence “is to be imposed on the vast majority of first offenders who commit the crime.” We reject this argument because the finding of an aggravated factor does not mandate imposition of an aggravated sentence.

¶15 The United States Supreme Court has long held that a person is not subjected to double jeopardy when an offense “is considered to be an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one.” Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948); accord Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992); -73, -82 (1980) (use of weapon as element of crime and sentencing factor did not violate double jeopardy); -81 (App. 2013).

County of Pima, (“From the inception of the juvenile justice system, courts have recognized that juvenile cases involved special interests that could not be adequately addressed by the adult criminal system.”); (public policy of Arizona‟s criminal justice system “to condemn, correct, or deter transgressions which harm either individual or public interests”).

Because the trial court was not required to specify either aggravating factors or mitigating factors in imposing presumptive sentences, we can only conclude that the court believed the analysis of both factors was integral to its ultimate conclusion.

In contrast, the public policy of Arizona’s Criminal Code is “to condemn, correct, or deter transgressions which harm either individual or public interests.” (citing A.R.S.

.’” quoting 4 (“It is not our place to pass on the wisdom of” legislative decisions concerning criminal procedure.); (“The authority to define crimes and fix the

“It is only within the [enhanced] range provided for dangerous class 2 felonies that the trial judge may consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” A.R.S.

the supreme court explained, No matter what the crime, the potential for serious bodily injury or loss of human life arises when a crime is committed with a dangerous weapon.

(“If the presence of a deadly weapon, as an element of the crime or otherwise, moves the legislature to impose more severe punishment for the offense, we must abide by the legislative determination.”).