Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Zaragoza, 659 P.2d 22.

154 citing documents.

State v. L & L Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
State v. L & L Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
State v. Alcantar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
State v. Alcantar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
State v. Winston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Winston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
A party’s opening statements should contain only facts that will be supported by evidence, Pedroza-Perez, 240 Ariz. at 116, ¶ 10, and closing argument should contain only facts that have been introduced in evidence
State of Arizona v. Larry James Fournier Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
State of Arizona v. Larry James Fournier Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
“Given the defendant’s heavy burden to prove prejudice, it ‘is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.’” Fierro, ().
State of Arizona v. Sergio Fierro Jr 517 P.3d 635 Ariz. 2022
State of Arizona v. Sergio Fierro Jr 517 P.3d 635 Ariz. 2022
¶24 Given the defendant’s heavy burden to prove prejudice, it “is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.” (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)).
State v. Madrigal Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Madrigal Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
But “some amount of emotion in closing argument is not only permissible, it is to be expected.”
State v. Wylie Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Wylie Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
See Jones, 197 Ariz. at 305, ¶ 37; (“Some amount of emotion in closing argument is not only permissible, it is to be expected.”).
State of Arizona v. James Clayton Johnson Ariz. 2019
State of Arizona v. James Clayton Johnson Ariz. 2019
¶24 Counsel is given wide latitude in closing argument to “comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences therefrom.”
State v. Bryant Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Bryant Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
The question then is not whether the jury improperly equated “physical injury” with “serious physical injury.” Instead, we must determine whether the common meaning of the word “serious,” coupled with the statutory definition of “physical injury” available to the jury, has essentially the same meaning as the statutory definition of “serious physical injury.” (when statutory definition and common definition are “essentially the same,” failure to include statutory definition in jury instructions i
State v. Ogle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Ogle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶27 Here, the prosecutor’s statements comparing the victims to Rosa Parks arguably “had emotional overtones,” but “some amount of emotion in closing argument is not only permissible, it is to be expected.”
State v. Love Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Love Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
§ 13-1001(A)(2); n.2 (1983) (“A person commits attempted sexual assault by doing any act that is a step toward committing a sexual assault with the intent to complete the offense.”).
State v. Meyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Meyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
(quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)); ¶ 20 (2005); State v. Van Adams, 194 5 STATE v. MEYER Decision of the Court Ariz. 408, 415, ¶ 17 (1999).
State v. Paskins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Paskins Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Cramer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Cramer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(“Wide latitude is given in closing arguments and counsel may comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences therefrom.”).
State v. Lua Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Lua Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
“It is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.”
State v. Dickinson 314 P.3d 1282 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State v. Dickinson 314 P.3d 1282 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
“ ‘It is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.’ ” , (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 , 97 S.Ct.
State v. Prince 61 P.3d 450 Ariz. 2003
State v. Prince 61 P.3d 450 Ariz. 2003
State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
d in every capital murder case but, rather, it should be reserved for cases in which either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime “above the norm of first-degree murders.” , 163 ¶ 169, , 1033 ¶ 169 (2000) ( , ); -69 , -28 (1983) (“either the circumstances of the killing are so shocking ...
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Van Adams 984 P.2d 16 Ariz. 1999
State v. Van Adams 984 P.2d 16 Ariz. 1999
*415 ¶ 17 We have previously held that rarely will an improperly given instruction “‘justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.’ ” , (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 , 97 S.Ct.
State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
159 , 130 L.Ed.2d 97 (1994) ( , , cert.
State v. Mata 916 P.2d 1035 Ariz. 1996
State v. Mata 916 P.2d 1035 Ariz. 1996
Raulerson v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 807 (11th Cir.1984), cert.
State v. Walden 905 P.2d 974 Ariz. 1995
State v. Walden 905 P.2d 974 Ariz. 1995