Cited by

shortly after he had the opportunity to observe the woman enter or leave the apartment alone”); -69 (1997) (finding strangulation murder and Molotov cocktail arson insufficiently similar where there were “only two likenesses—both victims were women who had angered defendant and [the same individual] may have been paid to commit the crimes”); (finding no abuse of discretion in admission of other act evidence for modus operandi where “the similarities of choice of victims (salesmen motel guests),

Bearup, ¶ 56, Dann, 220 Ariz. at 358 ¶ 10, 207 P.3d at 611; ¶ 44, State v. Henry (Henry II), State v. Henry (Henry I)

(upholding a trial court’s determination that a defendant was competent to waive his right to counsel based on psychiatric reports and the trial court’s own observations).

ong had a pecuniary motive to murder Farrah.3 The trial judge found that Armstrong’s discussions with co-conspirator David Doogan before the murders about taking Farrah’s property, combined with Armstrong’s deliberate actions in taking property after killing 2 Ring III cites former Vice Chief Justice Gordon’s -97, -02 (1983) ( ), for the proposition that the (F)(5) aggravating factor requires proof “that the murder would not have occurred but for the defendant’s pecuniary motive.” Ring III, 204

Thus, preclusion would not apply to claims involving such constitutional rights as the right to counsel, , the right to a jury trial, , or the right to be tried by a twelve-person jury, , unless the record establishes that the defendant has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiv

See Hughes, 189 Ariz. at 68 , 938 P.2d at 463 (concluding insufficient similarities where both victims were women who had angered defendant, and the same person may have been paid to commit the crimes); -90 , -95 (1983) (finding striking similarities where both victims had stayed at hotels, were similarly hogtied and gagged, and had personal items and vehicles stolen).

(pro se defendant did not have a constitutional right, attendant upon his right to self-representation, to walk about courtroom during trial so as to compel finding that his being shackled violated such right).

(severe beating with a pipe wrench, sufficient to fracture the victim’s skull, nose, and jaw, qualified as gratuitous violence when less violent means of killing available) -95 , -400 (1983) (finding that the savage beating of the victim, regardless of its timing, reflected a depraved mental state).

(“striking similarities” existed where both victims had stayed at hotels, were similarly hog-tied and gagged, and had personal effects and vehicles stolen).

-89 , -94 (1983) (pro se defendant wore shackles), cert.

3017 , 125 L.Ed.2d 707 (1993)

1058 , 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993); broad prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty violates due process, , sentencing by a judge violates the Sixth Amendment, , aff'd, 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct.

(mere diagnosis of mental illness does not necessarily preclude valid waiver); , (same).

-13 , -83 (1984) (victim had already been shot, and defendant knew that the victim could not resist when he shot him again); , (although originally resisting, the victims were tied up and unable effectively to resist prior to being killed), cert.

Ct. 2043, 114 L.Ed.2d 128 (1991); , (Arizona's death penalty statute is not capricious and withstands any claim that its application constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or violates due process).

at 2937 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 889 (pre-sentencing decisions by actors in the criminal justice system that may remove an accused from consideration for the death penalty are not unconstitutional); , cert.

3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (Arizona’s death penalty statute upheld as constitutional because it is not imposed arbitrarily or irrationally), , (9) Arizona’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it imposes cruel and unusual punishment, , (identical assertion rejected); (10) Arizona’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional because a prosecutor’s discretion to seek the death penalty is without standards, see Harding, 137 Ariz. at 292 , 670 P.2d at 397 (identical assertion rejecte

1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); -84 , -37 (1986) (denial of jury sentencing and defendant’s burden of proving mitigating evidence are not unconstitutional); , (restricting judge’s sentencing discretion is not unconstitutional); , (failure to involve a jury in the capital sentencing decision does not violate the sixth amendment).