Cited by

(“[T]he power to decide questions of trial strategy and tactics rests with counsel, and the decision as to what witnesses to call is a tactical, strategic decision.” (citations omitted)).

¶40 Furthermore, we observe that the right at issue reflects the fact that “[t]he ultimate decisions on whether to plead guilty, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are to be made by the [defendant].” ¶ 102 (2024) (same); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (noting 11 To maximize the utility of Donald advisements, we urge trial courts to further ensure that the record clearly and thoroughly reflects that a defendant has reviewed an offer with counsel

The testimonial right is personal to the defendant, United States v. Kowalczyk, 805 F.3d 847, 859 (9th Cir. 2015), so the defendant must himself decide whether to testify

¶7 Garcia Del Castillo argues his trial counsel “unilaterally overrode [his] request to testify.” The decision of whether to testify at trial is “exclusively the province of the accused.” (); see Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24.

(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).

¶ 18 (App. 2015) (-19, (1984)); see also Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014) (lawyer who made "inexcusable mistake of law" deemed ineffective).

Moreover, tactical or strategic decisions rest with counsel, State v. Lee , , 215, , 158 (1984), and we will presume "that the challenged action was sound trial strategy under the circumstances," State v. Stone , , 461, , 680 (App. 1986).

Additionally, “the decision as to what witnesses to call is a tactical, strategic decision.”

More fundamentally, “the power to decide questions of trial strategy and tactics rests with counsel.”

¶ 9 (2002); (deciding what witness to call is a strategic decision and the power to decide questions of trial strategy resides with counsel).

submitted with the state’s response, to conclude she had made a reasoned “tactical decision” to withdraw Speers’s proposed jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.4 The court noted our supreme court in State v. Lee held “[d]isagreements in trial tactics will not support a claim of ineffectiveness provided the conduct has some reasoned basis,” and concluded, on that ground, that Speers had failed to state a colorable claim that counsel perform

VI; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975)

¶11 “[T]he power to decide questions of trial strategy and tactics rests with counsel, and the decision as to what witnesses to call is a tactical, strategic decision.” (internal citation omitted).

A “reasonable probability” is defined as more than “a mere possibility” but less than “more likely than not.” ( ).

("[T]he decision as to what witnesses to call is a tactical, strategic decision.

(”[T]he decision as to what witnesses to call is a tactical, strategic decision.

(ultimate decisions about pleading guilty, waiving jury trial, and testifying are left to defendant).

Ariz. 333, ¶ 17, (right to twelve-person jury); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2052-53 (1973) (“Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.”); (although “certain basic decisions have come to belong to an accused,” such as “[t]he ultimate decisions on whether to plead guilty, whether to waive ju