Cited by

¶75 In State v. Winegar, the defendant argued that her murder conviction resulted from a confession obtained as a result of an invalid arrest

A reviewing court should give “great deference to trial court determinations of conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations.”

-48 (1985) (“arrest is complete when the suspect’s liberty of movement is interrupted and restricted by the police,” which “turns upon an evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would reasonably believe” he or she was being arrested).

¶10 “An arrest is complete when the suspect’s liberty of movement is interrupted and restricted by the police.” -48, -87 (1985).

Such a stop is constitutional at its inception “‘if supported by reasonable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot.” quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996); (“‘[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.’”), quoting United States v. Hensley, 469

¶11 Condiff also argues that after she provided the name, the encounter became nonconsensual because she tried to walk away but was followed and questioned by Officer C. As the State correctly points out and the trial court held in part, by that point the Officers had established reasonable suspicion that Condiff had committed a crime because she had 3 to support her argument that her acquiescence was not consensual.

(holding that because there was strong evidence that the suspect may have been armed, a weapons pat-down was reasonable because “an officer is justified in performing an immediate weapons pat-down if he reasonably suspects a weapon may be found”); State v. Smith, 136 Adz.

Wyman, 197 Ariz. at 13, ¶ 7, 3 P.3d at 395.

¶16 Merely asking or directing a person to act, by itself, does not render a choice involuntary when such a request is made “in the absence of protest or coercion.” (considering voluntariness of defendant’s movement to a building in terms of an illegal arrest).

ed that “[t]he question is not simply whether some other alternative was 2 Although we have suggested in the past that the test is “whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would reasonably believe that he was being arrested,” the Supreme Court has indicated that the appropriate focus is on the totality of the circumstances and reasonableness of the officer’s actions.

can better assess the impact of what occurs before him.” 7 n.18, n.18 (1983).

See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 612 (1985)

the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.”); , (“Terry stops are tolerated as an exception to the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment because they are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible.”).

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983); (Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because “they are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible”); P.2d 1135 (App. 1999) (continued detention of passenger following driver’s arrest justified by reasonable suspicion).

1 ¶ 19 We are mindful that several Arizona appellate opinions have stated, when addressing constitutional protections relating to searches and interrogation of suspects, that an arrest is “complete” when the suspect’s “liberty of movement is interrupted and restricted by the police.” , (-48 , -87 (1985)); , (-60 , -77 (1974)).

Navarro does not challenge the trial court’s factual findings but argues that his agreement to accompany Godoy did not signify “voluntary consent, but rather[,] acceptance of an unavoidable course of conduct,”

are not mixed questions of fact and law requiring this Court to substitute its judg *185 ment for the trial court’s. Application of the de novo standard requires an appellate court to substitute its judgment in instances where “the facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory or constitutional issue.”

The Detention as an “Arrest” Whether a defendant has been arrested “turns upon an evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would reasonably believe that he was being arrested.”

our supreme court considered whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements made by a defendant stopped by police on a street in Hagerman, Idaho.

1781 , 1790 n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982)

see also Ornelas v. United States, — U.S.-, -, 116 S.Ct.