Cited by

See, –65 (1986) (rejecting the federal inevitable discovery doctrine); –65 (1984) (holding that warrantless home entry is per se unlawful absent exigent circumstances); ¶ 114 (2021) (Bolick, J., dissenting) (contending that the private affairs clause provides greater protection against warrantless searches than the Fourth Amendment); see generally

See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537–38 (1988)

To that end, we have held that the exclusionary rule, for example, as a matter of state law is “no broader than the federal rule.” (“It is poor judicial policy for rules 12 STATE V. MIXTON Opinion of the Court governing the suppression of evidence to differ depending upon whether the defendant is arrested by federal or state officers.”)

Smith observes that article 2, section 8 was intended to give individuals a sense of security in their “homes and personal possessions.” Bolt addressed warrantless entry into the home and stated that Arizona’s Constitution specifically preserves “the sanctity of homes .

See, e.g. , Hernandez , , ¶¶ 11-23, ; State v. Bolt , , 263-65, , 522-24 (1984).

¶19 In concluding Arizona's exclusionary rule "is no broader than the federal rule" in State v. Bolt , , 269, , 528 (1984), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the rule in Arizona must mirror the federal rule.

In State v. Bolt , , our supreme court considered extending the state application of the exclusionary rule beyond the federal application as to state constitutional violations.

See, e.g. , State v. Ault , , 463, , 549 (1986) ; State v. Bolt , , 264-65, , 523-24 (1984) ; see also State v. Peltz , , 30 ¶ 24 n.3, , 1222 n.3 (App. 2017) ("[T]he right of privacy under article II, § 8 has not been expanded beyond that provided by the Fourth Amendment, except in cases involving unlawful, warrantless home entries.").

That is, evidence “seized during, or obtained as a result of, a warrantless entry [into a] defendant’s home without the excuse of exigent circumstances” must be “suppressed as the fruit of the illegal entry.”

Under that “right to privacy” clause, “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8; (under Arizona law, “officers may not make a warrantless entry into a home in the absence of exigent circumstances or other necessity”); (absent any showing of exigent circumstances or other necessity, officers violated article 2, § 8 by entering defendant’s residence without a warrant, inspecting and “securing” the premises, and

See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231-32 (2011)

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)

-67, -26 (1984); cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700-01 (2009) (“The principal cost of applying the [exclusionary] rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free – something that ‘offends basic concepts of

as a matter of state law [to be] no broader than the federal rule,” in the context of DUI cases, we have endeavored to “assiduously protect[] the right to counsel” by liberally applying “stringent remedies, ranging from suppression of any evidence obtained after [a] violation [of the right to counsel] to outright dismissal of the action,” Rosengren

See, e.g., State v. Martin, 139 Ariz. *583 466, 473, (holding that the Arizona Constitution is “even more explicit” than the Fourth Amendment in safeguarding the home); -65 , -24 (1984) (“While Arizona’s constitutional provisions generally were intended to incorporate the federal protections ...

However, -65, -24 (1984), which held that Article 2, Section 8 is more specific than its federal counterpart in protecting the home, the court of appeals concluded that “a canine sniff that occurs at the threshold of a home, and collects information from inside

titutional provisions generally were intended to parallel federal constitutional protections, , 246 P. 548, 549 (1926), Arizona’s highest court has observed that article II, § 8 is worded differently than the Fourth Amendment and is more specific than its federal counterpart in “preserving the sanctity of homes and in creating a right of privacy.” -65 , -24 (1984).

ht of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Our supreme court has stated that, although “Arizona’s constitutional provisions generally were intended to incorporate the federal protections, they are specific in preserving the sanctity of homes and in creating a right of privacy.” -65, -24 (1984) (citation omitted); 6 Johnson asserts “[t]he State .

See, -65 , -24 (1984) (holding that police officers’ warrantless entry of defendant’s home in the absence of exigent circumstances to “secure” the residence until a search warrant could be obtained violated Article 2, Section 8).

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3385 (1984)

approved as modified, , (finding home entry without warrant and without exigent circumstances unlawful under “our own constitutional provision”).

See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233 (search of home without a warrant or consent is unreasonable unless exigent circumstances exist); (evidence seized as a result of a warrantless entry into a defendant’s home -15- without the excuse of exigent circumstances is per se unlawful under the Arizona Constitution and should have been suppressed).

.2d 674, 682 (1987) (applying pxlvacy guarantee to decide that an individual in a chronic vegetative state had a right, through a guardian, to refuse treatment and choose death); , 458 n. 2, ¶ 13, , 32 n. 2 (2002) (commenting that right described in Rasmussen not recognized under federal constitution); -65 , -24 (1984) (holding Arizona’s privacy provision bestows greater privacy rights in a pex’son’s home than Fourth Amendment).