Cited by

See, –70 (1985) (“The problem in interpreting the statute at issue is not that certain words or groups of words have more than one meaning, but it is the failure to include necessary words which causes confusion as to the scope of the statute.”).

–70 (1985) (internal citation omitted).

(“An ambiguity may also be found to exist where there is uncertainty as to the meaning of the terms of a statute.”).

(contrasting legislative decision to change an existing statute from legislative decision to merely clarify the statute); Clarify, Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 380 (2001) (“to make (an idea, statement, etc.) clear or intelligible; to free from ambiguity”); see also, e.g., In re Marriage of

State v. 10 (an amendment enacted one year after the original version indicated an intent to clarify the earlier statute).

The Department, , posits that a statute may be found to be ambiguous if there is uncertainty concerning the meaning of its terms or its scope when all its provisions are examined.

“[W]hen ‘determining the intent of the legislature, the court may consider both prior and subsequent statutes in pari materia.’” quoting Automatic Registering Mach.

(under "accepted rule of statutory construction" of in pari materia, court may consider other relevant statutes).

(stating that an amendment enacted one year after the original version indicated an intent to clarify the earlier statute).

Ambiguity arises not only from the meaning of particular words, but “may arise in respect to the general scope and meaning of a statute when all its provisions are examined.”

(explaining development of statute may be used to ascertain original intent and suggesting when an amendment modifies an ambiguous statute soon after its original enactment, such amendment may properly be construed as a clarification rather than a change).

- 70, -25 (1985); In re 1996 Nissan Sentra

¶9 When a statute is ambiguous, we “„may consider both prior and subsequent statutes in pari materia.‟” Sweet, quoting Automatic Registering Mach.

an argument similar to the one 9 Falcone makes here and reversed a trial court‟s direction of acquittal that had been based on evidence of the defendant‟s “good faith”—but mistaken—“belief that the prosecutrix was over the age of eighteen years.”9 -42, -84 (1969); (when determining legislative intent, court may consider both prior and subsequent statutes in pari materia).

Co., , (statutory text that “allows for more than one rational interpretation” permits a court to “resolve doubt by resorting to statutory interpretation”); , (“An *219 ambiguity in a statute is ‘not simply that arising from the meaning of particular words, but includes such as may arise in respect to the general scope and meaning of a statute when all its provisions are examined.’ ” (quoting 73 Am.

Arizona Found, for Neurology and Psychiatry v. Sienerth, 13 Ariz.App.

(finding that “[t]he aim of the legislature in enacting provisions for - 8 - enhanced or mandatory sentences for repeat offenders .

The court in Stuck agreed with this court’s , vacated in pari on other grounds, , in which we held that statements the defendant had made to police officers upon arrest about “a robbery that occurred at his house, ownership of the seized contraband, and the possibility of making a deal with the authorities whereby he could work off his charge by helping the police make a drug

(“an amendment which, in effect, construes and clarifies a prior statute will be accepted as the legislative declaration of the original act”)(quotation omitted).

that ‘[a]n amendment which, in effect, construes and clarifies a prior statute will be accepted as the legislative declaration of the original act.’ ” , ( , ); see generally 2 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 41.11, at 289-90 (4th ed.1973) (cited in Canisius College v. United States, 799 F.2d 18, 27 (2d Cir.1986)) (curative legislation is typica

“[O]nly where a statute is ambiguous or unclear is a court at liberty to resort to the rules of statutory interpretation.”

“It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that when ‘determining the intent of the legislature, the court may consider both prior and subsequent statutes in pari materia.”’ , (citations omitted).