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Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Sweet, 693 P.2d 921.

202 citing documents.

Lincoln v. Holt 156 P.3d 438 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
-71 , -26 (quoting State ex rel.
Gamez v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 141 P.3d 794 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Veronica T. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 126 P.3d 154 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Veronica T. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 126 P.3d 154 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
-70 , -25 (1985) (stating that when a statute can be interpreted in more than one way the court must look to the legislative intent to determine its meaning).
State v. Fell 115 P.3d 594 Ariz. 2005
State v. Fell 115 P.3d 594 Ariz. 2005
State v. Fell 97 P.3d 902 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Fell 97 P.3d 902 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
§§ 1-244 and 1-246 together in harmony, as we must, -71 , -26 (1985), requires that we consider a prospective application of a statute that substantively affects a penalty to mean that the statute may only apply to persons whose offenses were committed after the enactment of the statute proscribing a new penalty.
Riepe v. Riepe 91 P.3d 312 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Nelson 90 P.3d 206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Nelson 90 P.3d 206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
¶ 9 “An ambiguity in a statute is ‘not simply that arising from the meaning of particular words, but includes such as may arise in respect to the general scope and meaning of a statute when all its provisions are examined.’” , (quoting 73 Am.
Bentivegna v. Powers Steel & Wire Products, Inc. 81 P.3d 1040 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Bentivegna v. Powers Steel & Wire Products, Inc. 81 P.3d 1040 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State of Arizona v. Christina Marie George Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State of Arizona v. Christina Marie George Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Marriage of Woodworth v. Woodworth 42 P.3d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Marriage of Woodworth v. Woodworth 42 P.3d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
(“If reasonably practical, a statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes to the end that they may be harmonious and consistent.” (citing State ex.
Welch-Doden v. Roberts 42 P.3d 1166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Welch-Doden v. Roberts 42 P.3d 1166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
-30 , -34 (App.1989); -71 , -26 (1985)
True v. Stewart 18 P.3d 707 Ariz. 2001
In Re Timothy M. 4 P.3d 449 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
In Re Timothy M. 4 P.3d 449 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Bills v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund 984 P.2d 574 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
Bills v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund 984 P.2d 574 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
Although a statutory amendment made shortly after the original enactment sometimes may clarify ambiguities in the earlier version, , , we do not believe that canon of statutory construction realistically applies here, when a new generation of legislators amended the statute twenty-one years after its original passage.
Toni W. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 993 P.2d 462 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Toni W. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 993 P.2d 462 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
(amendment that clarified statute is legislative declaration of the original act).
Rineer v. Leonardo 977 P.2d 767 Ariz. 1999
Rineer v. Leonardo 977 P.2d 767 Ariz. 1999
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court 972 P.2d 179 Ariz. 1999
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court 972 P.2d 179 Ariz. 1999
See, , (amendment enacted one year after original version of statute was clarification rather than change); , (amendment enacted one year after statute was used for clarification).
State v. Cornish 968 P.2d 606 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. Cornish 968 P.2d 606 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. Garcia 943 P.2d 870 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. Garcia 943 P.2d 870 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
(“The aim of the legislature in enacting provisions for enhanced or mandatory sentences for repeat offenders, as evidenced by A.R.S.
State v. Baca 926 P.2d 528 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Baca 926 P.2d 528 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
-71 , -26 (1985) (statutes which relate *65 to the same subject matter must be construed together).
Centric-Jones Co. v. Town of Marana 937 P.2d 654 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Centric-Jones Co. v. Town of Marana 937 P.2d 654 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
This rule of construction applies even where the statutes were enacted at differ *471 ent times, and contain no reference one to the other____ -71 , -26 (1985) (quoting State ex rel.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Arizona Board of Chiropractic Examiners 931 P.2d 426 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Arizona Board of Chiropractic Examiners 931 P.2d 426 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Viewing the statutory scheme as a whole and harmonizing apparent conflicts, , we believe that the legislature has shifted from a posture where health care services, such as physical therapy, could be provided only by licensed individuals to one where such services can be provided by licensed individuals and supervised assistants of those individuals who are themselves sub
Tallent v. National General Insurance 915 P.2d 665 Ariz. 1996
Tallent v. National General Insurance 915 P.2d 665 Ariz. 1996
State v. Shlionsky 911 P.2d 637 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
State v. Shlionsky 911 P.2d 637 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
State v. Cid 892 P.2d 216 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
State v. Cid 892 P.2d 216 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
A complementary rule of statutory construction holds that, whenever possible, statutes which are in pari materia are read together and harmonized, see -71 , -26 (1985); , to avoid rendering any clause, sentence or word “superfluous, void, contradictory or insignificant.” , 827 * (
Weekly v. City of Mesa 888 P.2d 1346 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Weekly v. City of Mesa 888 P.2d 1346 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Stramka v. Salt River Recreation, Inc. 877 P.2d 1339 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Stramka v. Salt River Recreation, Inc. 877 P.2d 1339 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
(“It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that when determining the intent of the legislature, the court may consider both prior and subsequent statutes in pari materia”) (internal cites omitted).

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