Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. LaGrand, 733 P.2d 1066.
- Summer P. v. Shirley M. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- Summer P. v. Shirley M. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Younan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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State v. Younan
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
See, (“When a defendant has repeatedly claimed ‘irreconcilable conflict’ with a series of attorneys, the court may deny a motion for yet another lawyer where the orderly administration of justice so requires.”); (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to remove counsel in light of lengthy pretrial 6 STATE v. YOUNAN Decision of the Court delay and the fact that “counsel had already been changed once”); Daniels v. W
- State v. Walker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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State v. Walker
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
n of counsel is necessary, including “whether an irreconcilable conflict exists between counsel and the accused, and whether new counsel would be confronted with the same conflict; the timing of the motion; inconvenience to witnesses; the time period already elapsed between the alleged offense and trial; the proclivity of the defendant to change counsel; and quality of counsel.” -87 (1987).
- State v. Fernandez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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State v. Fernandez
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Accordingly, “a request for new counsel should be examined with the rights and interest of the defendant in mind tempered by exigencies of judicial economy.”
- State v. Walker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Walker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Trejo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Trejo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Bos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Bos
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
VI; see also Ariz. Const. art 2, § 24.
- State of Arizona v. Robert Hernandez 305 P.3d 378 Ariz. 2013
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State of Arizona v. Robert Hernandez
305 P.3d 378
Ariz. 2013
at 187 ¶ 31, 119 P.3d at 454 (–87, –70 (1987)).
- State v. Fabio Evelio Gomez 293 P.3d 495 Ariz. 2012
- State v. Fabio Evelio Gomez 293 P.3d 495 Ariz. 2012
- State v. Dann 207 P.3d 604 Ariz. 2009
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State v. Dann
207 P.3d 604
Ariz. 2009
State v. LaGrand (LaGrand I), -87, -70 (1987).
- State v. Peralta 212 P.3d 51 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- State v. Peralta 212 P.3d 51 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- State v. Baker 170 P.3d 727 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
- State v. Baker 170 P.3d 727 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
- State of Arizona v. Jill Irene Paris-Sheldon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
- State of Arizona v. Jill Irene Paris-Sheldon Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
- State v. Gomez 123 P.3d 1131 Ariz. 2005
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State v. Gomez
123 P.3d 1131
Ariz. 2005
“[A] defendant is ‘entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by evidence.’” Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 343 ¶ 60, 111 P.3d at 385 ( ).
- Robinson v. Hotham 118 P.3d 1129 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
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Robinson v. Hotham
118 P.3d 1129
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)
- State v. Cromwell 119 P.3d 448 Ariz. 2005
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State v. Cromwell
119 P.3d 448
Ariz. 2005
-47, -62 (1997); -87, -70 (1987); see also Moody, 192 Ariz. at 508- 09, ¶ 21, 968 P.2d at 581-82.
- State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
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State v. Anderson
111 P.3d 369
Ariz. 2005
A defendant is “entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by evidence.”
- State v. Torres 93 P.3d 1056 Ariz. 2004
- State v. Torres 93 P.3d 1056 Ariz. 2004
- Daniel Y. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 77 P.3d 55 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
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Daniel Y. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
77 P.3d 55
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Henry, 189 Ariz. at 546-47 , 944 P.2d at 61 -62 (-87 , -70 (1987)).
- State v. Torres 75 P.3d 142 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
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State v. Torres
75 P.3d 142
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
See, e.g., State v. *54 LaGrand, , (treating appellant’s pro se motion to remove his counsel as a motion for substitute counsel).
- State v. Doerr 969 P.2d 1168 Ariz. 1998
- State v. Moody 968 P.2d 578 Ariz. 1998
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State v. Doerr
969 P.2d 1168
Ariz. 1998
Therefore, he claims, it was appropriate for the jury to consider whether he “was the perpetrator or was merely present.” ¶ 35 A trial court should instruct “on any theory reasonably supported by evidence.” , see also United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1984) (requiring instruction be given “if there is evidence upon which the *65 jury could rationally sustain the defense”).
- State v. Moody 968 P.2d 578 Ariz. 1998
- State v. Djerf 959 P.2d 1274 Ariz. 1998
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State v. Djerf
959 P.2d 1274
Ariz. 1998
at 591 , 858 P.2d at 1194 (-87 , -70 (1987)).
- State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
- State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
- State v. Henry 944 P.2d 57 Ariz. 1997
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State v. Henry
944 P.2d 57
Ariz. 1997
tempered by exigencies of judicial economy.”