Cited by

See, –65 (1986) (rejecting the federal inevitable discovery doctrine); –65 (1984) (holding that warrantless home entry is per se unlawful absent exigent circumstances); ¶ 114 (2021) (Bolick, J., dissenting) (contending that the private affairs clause

See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (privacy expectation extends beyond physical movements and encompasses record of those movements as captured through cell-site location information); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990) (subjective privacy expectation legitimate if society prepared to recognize expectation as reasonable); (Arizona’s constitution is “specific in preserving the sanctity of homes and in creating 1In Kyllo, the Supreme Court determined that the w

¶ 7 (App. 2002); (“Doubtful or marginal affidavits should be considered in light of the preference of validity accorded search warrants.”) (citation omitted).

(“The Arizona Constitution is even more explicit than its federal counterpart in safeguarding the fundamental liberty of Arizona citizens.”) 7 STATE v. WAGNER Opinion of the Court ¶21 The superior c

We have observed that “[t]he Arizona Constitution is even more explicit than its federal counterpart in safeguarding the fundamental liberty of Arizona citizens.”

See State v. Ault , , 463, , 549 (1986).

See, e.g. , State v. Ault , , 463, , 549 (1986) ; State v. Bolt , , 264-65, , 523-24 (1984) ; see also State v. Peltz , , 30 ¶ 24 n.3, , 1222 n.3 (App. 2017) ("[T]he right of privacy under article II, § 8 has not been expanded beyond that provided by the Fourth Amendment, except

Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)

(noting that the state bears the burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement).

¶15 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 8, of the Arizona Constitution “proscribe unreasonable search and seizure by the state.” U.S. Const. amend.

Under that “right to privacy” clause, “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8; (under Arizona law, “officers may not make a warrantless entry into a home in the absence of exigent circumstances or other necessity”); (absent any showing of exigent circumstances or other necessity, officers violated article

¶11 A significant factor in determining whether an arrest has occurred “is the extent that freedom of movement is curtailed and the degree and manner of force used.”

IV; United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985)

¶ 7 (App. 2002); (“Doubtful or marginal affidavits should be considered in light of the preference of validity accorded search warrants.”) (citation omitted).

Police do not create exigent circumstances if they do “not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency.” Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011); -33, -37 (1989) ( ).

Article 2, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution ¶40 Hausner also argues that the wiretap violated Article 2, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution, which states that “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” n.1, he argues that Article 2, § 8 forbids the warrantless intrusion into a home absent exigent circumstances, the exigency cannot be created by 20 police inaction, and any exigency here resulted only because the police chose not to arr

-66 , -52 (1986) (concluding that evidence seized pursuant to a valid search warrant based on independent-source evidence was admissible, notwithstanding an invalid initial warrantless entry).

Arizona law prevents officers from “mak[ing] a warrant-less entry into a home in the absence of exigent circumstances or other necessity.”

“Unlawful entry of homes was the chief evil which the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent.”