Cited by

¶ 114 (2004) (citing cases)

¶14 Rodriguez next asserts his statement was involuntary because “it was uttered when [he] was extremely distraught and emotional after learning he had killed someone.” In the absence of threats, intimidation, deception, or “physical or psychological pressures exerted by the police,” the fact that Rodriguez was “extremely distraught and emotional” has no bearing on the admissibility of his statements.

He was then asked to provide a buccal swab of his saliva, but after a brief discussion, he refused the request, demonstrating his will was not overborne from lack of sleep or any “physical or psychological pressure exerted by the police.”

-46 (1988) (a confession was “voluntary” in the absence of “coercive police tactics,” although other circumstances “may render his laid foundation for admission of the letter through expert testimony that matched the letter to Fournier’s handwriting.

–42 (1988) (recounting expert testimony “that a person may or may not leave a fingerprint after touching an object” and “it would be easy, either intentionally or unintentionally, to wipe off fingerprints .

Material to guilt or punishment means “a reasonable probability that, had the exculpatory evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 685-86 (1985)).

State v. Tucker , , 440, , 586 (1988).

(citing Brady, 373 U.S. 83; U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-84 (1985)); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

“The choices of whether to impose a sanction and which sanction to impose are left to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse.”

Berning, ¶ 21, (upholding victim’s right to refuse pre-trial interview); (noting that although there is no general federal constitutional right to discovery, “the Constitution does impose on the prosecution a due process obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence that is material on the issue of guilt or punishment.”) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

er this less- than-ideal police work in deciding the matter”); (instruction adequate when defendant lost opportunity to independently test evidence); (instruction “accomplished the most that the defendant could have proved” from destroyed evidence); (instruction allowed “jury [to] infer exactly what the destroyed evidence, at best, could 16 have proved”); (finding dismissal required when state destroyed critical e

But, if the defendant is so intoxicated “that he could not understand the meaning of his statements, then the statements were involuntary.”

See Smith, 974 P.2d at 436; -46, -92 (1988); United States v. Coleman, 208 F.3d 786, 791 (9th Cir. 2000) (heroin withdrawal alone insufficient to establish confession involuntary).

In addition, although “[precluding evidence is rarely an appropriate sanction,” Towery, 186 Ariz. at 186 , 920 P.2d at 308 , “[generally, there is no abuse of discretion if the defendant suffers no prejudice.”

(“There is no general federal constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”); Norgord v. State ex Rel.

Furthermore, her report was insufficient to establish that his statements were “so unreliable that they [should have] be[en] excluded under the evidentiary laws of the forum.” State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 445-46, -92 (1988).

(noting that extreme intoxication does not rob a confession of voluntariness but might undermine its reliability).

(observing that, without reversal, counsel may consider admonition only a “verbal spanking”).