Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Long v. Dick, 347 P.2d 581.

68 citing documents.

Stambaugh v. Butler 379 P.3d 250 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Stambaugh v. Butler 379 P.3d 250 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
This is particularly true when, as here, the Department’s construction of the statute is “long continued,” , -29 , and when a contrary outcome would upset settled understandings, , (“Where there has been such a background of acquiescence in the meaning of a law unless manifestly erroneous, we will not disturb it.”); Bohannan v. Corp. Comm’
Florence v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Florence v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
And although administrative interpretation of statutes is not binding on the court, the court will accept an administrative body’s interpretation when there is “[a]cquiescence in meaning over long periods of time” so long as the interpretation is not “manifestly erroneous.” Ariz. Water Co., 208 Ariz. at 154-55, ¶ 30, 91 P.3d at 997-98.
Scenic Arizona v. City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment 268 P.3d 370 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Scenic Arizona v. City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment 268 P.3d 370 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
-84 (1959) (explaining that “the members of the legislature were repeatedly made aware of the operation of the statute and must have known its administrative interpretation and application.
Arizona Water Co. v. Arizona Department of Water Resources 91 P.3d 990 Ariz. 2004
Az Water Co v. Az Dept of Water Resources Ariz. 2004
Arizona Water Co. v. Arizona Department of Water Resources 91 P.3d 990 Ariz. 2004
(holding that although administrative interpretation of statutes is not binding on the court, the court will accept an administrative body’s interpre *155 tation when there is “[acquiescence in meaning over long periods of time” so long as the interpretation is not “manifestly erroneous”
Az Water Co v. Az Dept of Water Resources Ariz. 2004
(holding that although administrative interpretation of statutes is not binding on the court, the court will accept an administrative body’s interpretation when there is “[a]cquiescence in meaning over long periods of time” so long as the interpretation is not “manifestly erroneous”)
State v. Turner 855 P.2d 442 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Turner 855 P.2d 442 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
(“while administrative interpretation is not binding where long continued and in cases of ambiguity we will acquiesce therein”); , (“although the administrative interpretation is not binding upon us, in cases of serious doubt we will not adopt a different construction”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 ,-, 111 S.Ct.
State v. Ramos 747 P.2d 629 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
State v. Ramos 747 P.2d 629 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
Mecham Recall Committee, Inc. v. Corbin 745 P.2d 950 Ariz. 1987
Mecham Recall Committee, Inc. v. Corbin 745 P.2d 950 Ariz. 1987
As the Supreme Court of Arizona stated on page 29 , [(1959)]: ‘In our final conclusion in this case, we gave controlling weight to the fact that during this twelve-year period, the members of the legislature were repeatedly made aware of the operation of the statute and must have known of its administrative interpretation and application.’ Based upon the
Fund Manager v. TUCSON POLICE & FIRE 708 P.2d 92 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
Fund Manager v. TUCSON POLICE & FIRE 708 P.2d 92 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
City of Phoenix v. Superior Court 677 P.2d 1283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
City of Phoenix v. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cty. 677 P.2d 1283 Ariz. 1984
City of Phoenix v. Superior Court 677 P.2d 1283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of the statute and intent of the legislature, , 80 A.L.R.2d 949 , and we will interpret the statute in such a way as to give it a fair and sensible meaning.
City of Phoenix v. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cty. 677 P.2d 1283 Ariz. 1984
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of the statute and intent of the legislature, , 80 A.L.R.2d 949 , and we will interpret the statute in such a way as to give it a fair and sensible meaning.
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Mohave County 649 P.2d 262 Ariz. 1982
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Mohave County 649 P.2d 262 Ariz. 1982
McLeod v. Chilton 643 P.2d 712 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
McLeod v. Chilton 643 P.2d 712 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
Mummert v. Thunderbird Lanes, Inc.
State v. Fendler 622 P.2d 23 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
State v. Fendler 622 P.2d 23 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
While we are not bound by administrative interpretation, “where long continued and in cases of ambiguity we will acquiesce therein.” , , 80 A.L.R.2d 949 (1961).
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation v. Industrial Commission 611 P.2d 938 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation v. Industrial Commission 611 P.2d 938 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Cohen v. State 588 P.2d 299 Ariz. 1978
Cohen v. State 588 P.2d 299 Ariz. 1978
Dearing v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 589 P.2d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
Dearing v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 589 P.2d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
Manhattan-Dickman Construction Co. v. Shawler 558 P.2d 894 Ariz. 1976
Manhattan-Dickman Construction Co. v. Shawler 558 P.2d 894 Ariz. 1976
Morris v. Arizona Corporation Commission 539 P.2d 928 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Morris v. Arizona Corporation Commission 539 P.2d 928 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Watkins Cigarette Service, Inc. v. Arizona State Tax Commission 526 P.2d 708 Ariz. 1974
Watkins Cigarette Service, Inc. v. Arizona State Tax Commission 526 P.2d 708 Ariz. 1974
Arizona Foundation for Neurology & Psychiatry v. Sienerth 477 P.2d 758 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Arizona Foundation for Neurology & Psychiatry v. Sienerth 477 P.2d 758 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
In the cases cited by appellants for this proposition, City of Mesa v. Killingsworth, supra; Jenney Freight Line v. Arizona Express, Inc., , ; , there was an administrative practice of long standing and uniform interpretation of the statute involved, whereas in the present case the record shows that although four building permits were issued to Camelback Hospital between the period of annexation and commencement of this suit, three of th
Bergstresser v. Industrial Commission 474 P.2d 450 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Bergstresser v. Industrial Commission 474 P.2d 450 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Swift & Company v. State Tax Commission 462 P.2d 775 Ariz. 1969
Swift & Company v. State Tax Commission 462 P.2d 775 Ariz. 1969
80 A.L.R.2d 949 , we said: “In our final conclusion in this case, we give controlling weight to the fact *231 that during this twelve-year period the members of the legislature were repeatedly made aware of the operation of the statute and must have known its administrative interpretation and
Swift & Co. v. State Tax Commission 455 P.2d 459 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Swift & Co. v. State Tax Commission 455 P.2d 459 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
80 A.L.R.2d 949 (1959); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 , 56 S.Ct.
Industrial Commission v. Harbor Insurance Company 449 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1968
Industrial Commission v. Harbor Insurance Company 449 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1968