Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Deering Ex Rel. Deering v. Carter, 376 P.2d 857.

44 citing documents.

KAUFMAN v. GUEVARA Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
KAUFMAN v. GUEVARA Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
should not be adopted as the standard of care; instead, the legal analysis should be governed by various sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) (“Restatement”).1 ¶12 Negligence per se “describe[s] those instances where certain acts or omissions constitute negligence without further inquiry [into] the circumstances or reasonableness of their occurrence.”
Ibarra v. Gastelum 471 P.3d 1028 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Ibarra v. Gastelum 471 P.3d 1028 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶7 Negligence per se “describe[s] those instances where certain acts or omissions constitute negligence without further inquiry [into] the circumstances or reasonableness of their occurrence.”
Steinberger v. McVey 318 P.3d 419 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Steinberger v. McVey 318 P.3d 419 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
(“In establishing [negligence per se], the jury need only find that the party committed the specif *139 ic act prohibited, or omitted to do the specific act required by the statute or ordinance.”).
Huerta v. Nelson 213 P.3d 193 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Huerta v. Nelson 213 P.3d 193 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
This rule applies even when cases are “involuntarily consolidated by order of the court.” -34 , -61 (1962).
Hutto v. Francisco 107 P.3d 934 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Hutto v. Francisco 107 P.3d 934 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
(jury instruction was erroneous that stated that the failure to drive an appropriate reduced speed when approaching or crossing an intersection or hill crest in the presence of an actual or potential hazard was negligence per se); Griffith, 126 Ariz. at 229 , 613 P.2d at 1285 (violation
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 861 P.2d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 861 P.2d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
The following are illustrative: “[Y]our verdict must be for the Defendant and against the Plaintiff____”
Ingrum v. Tucson Yellow Cab Co. 642 P.2d 868 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1981
Ingrum v. Tucson Yellow Cab Co. 642 P.2d 868 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1981
Griffith v. VALLEY OF SUN RECOVERY, ETC. 613 P.2d 1283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Griffith v. VALLEY OF SUN RECOVERY, ETC. 613 P.2d 1283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Similarly, , the court stated that: When, as here, the statute does not proscribe certain or specific acts, but defines a standard of conduct against which the jury must measure the party's conduct, a finding that the party violated the statutory standard is a finding that the party was negligent.
Kilberg v. State 484 P.2d 33 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
Hall v. Mertz 480 P.2d 361 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
Hall v. Mertz 480 P.2d 361 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
Company, , J. H. Welch & , ; , , ; Young Candy &amp
Santanello v. Cooper 468 P.2d 390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Santanello v. Cooper 468 P.2d 390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Ruiz v. Faulkner 470 P.2d 500 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Ruiz v. Faulkner 470 P.2d 500 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
If such evidence be submitted it becomes a jury question as to whether he was driving at a prudent and lawful speed (numerous citations omitted).” (Emphasis added) See also:
Heimke v. Munoz 462 P.2d 819 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Heimke v. Munoz 462 P.2d 819 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Brand v. JH Rose Trucking Company 427 P.2d 519 Ariz. 1967
Brand v. JH Rose Trucking Company 427 P.2d 519 Ariz. 1967
Whitly v. Moore 427 P.2d 350 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
Whitly v. Moore 427 P.2d 350 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
Wolfswinkel v. Southern Pac.
Rogers v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. 412 P.2d 272 Ariz. 1966
Rogers v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. 412 P.2d 272 Ariz. 1966
J. H. Welch & , ; , .
Yanez v. State 412 P.2d 284 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Applications of Oppenheimer, , Petition of Walker, , rehearing denied
LeRoy v. Phillips 399 P.2d 669 Ariz. 1965
LeRoy v. Phillips 399 P.2d 669 Ariz. 1965
Aguilar v. Carpenter 399 P.2d 124 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
Aguilar v. Carpenter 399 P.2d 124 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
Ariz. Const. Art. 18, § 5, A.R.S.; , ; , .
Stearman v. Miranda 396 P.2d 622 Ariz. 1964
Stearman v. Miranda 396 P.2d 622 Ariz. 1964
See, e. g. Young Candy & Tobacco Company v. Montoya, supra ; , ; , ; , ; , .
Marks v. Goodding 394 P.2d 192 Ariz. 1964
Marks v. Goodding 394 P.2d 192 Ariz. 1964
J. H. Welch & Son Contracting Co. v. Gardner 392 P.2d 567 Ariz. 1964
J. H. Welch & Son Contracting Co. v. Gardner 392 P.2d 567 Ariz. 1964
In establishing its existence, the jury need only find that the party committed the specific act prohibited, or omitted to do the specific act required by the statute or ordinance.” , .
Dobbertin v. Johnson 390 P.2d 849 Ariz. 1964
Dobbertin v. Johnson 390 P.2d 849 Ariz. 1964
While this court has consistently held that breach of a statute or traffic ordinance amounts to negligence per se} , , such breach cannot be considered a sine qua non of negligence.