Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Heywood v. Ziol, 372 P.2d 200.
- Helmer v. Padilla Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
- Helmer v. Padilla Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
- Cruger v. Blansette Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
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Cruger v. Blansette
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
¶11 A forcible detainer action “is a statutory proceeding, the object of which is to provide a summary, speedy and adequate means for obtaining possession of premises by one entitled to actual possession.”
- S S Holdings v. American Green Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
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S S Holdings v. American Green
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
§ 12–1171(3); (noting that the issue of possession “can only be 5 S & S HOLDINGS v. AMERICAN GREEN Decision of the Court determined after a presentation of the facts and attending circumstances upon which the right to possession is cl
- Secure Ventures v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
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Secure Ventures v. Johnson
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶16 A forcible detainer action is a statutory proceeding, “the object of which is to provide a summary, speedy and adequate means for obtaining possession of premises by one entitled to actual possession.”
- Sutto, Jr. v. Bonham Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
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Sutto, Jr. v. Bonham
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
According to Bonham, this purported statutory violation voids the trustee’s sale and the Suttos therefore have no lawful claim against him.1 ¶6 A forcible detainer action is a statutory proceeding, “the object of which is to provide a summary, speedy and adequate means for obtaining possession of premises by one entitled to actual possession.”
- Partners v. Alvarez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- Partners v. Alvarez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- Bank of Ny v. St. John Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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Bank of Ny v. St. John
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶7 “[F]orcible entry and detainer is a statutory proceeding, the object of which is to provide a summary, speedy and adequate means for obtaining possession of premises by one entitled to actual possession.”
- Deutsche Bank v. Bilyea Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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Deutsche Bank v. Bilyea
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
¶5 “[F]orcible entry and detainer is a statutory proceeding, the object of which is to provide a summary, speedy and adequate means for obtaining possession of premises by one entitled to actual possession.”
- Colonial Tri-City Ltd. Partnership v. Ben Franklin Stores, Inc. 880 P.2d 648 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
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Colonial Tri-City Ltd. Partnership v. Ben Franklin Stores, Inc.
880 P.2d 648
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
DVM Co. v. Stag Tobacconist, Ltd.
- Hill-Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust 799 P.2d 810 Ariz. 1990
- Hill-Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust 799 P.2d 810 Ariz. 1990
- Hill-Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust 784 P.2d 691 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
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Hill-Shafer Partnership v. Chilson Family Trust
784 P.2d 691
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
in which the court noted the facts showed two unilateral mistakes existed since each party was laboring under a different interpretation of the legal effect of the contract provision in dispute.
- Buckmaster v. Dent 707 P.2d 319 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
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Buckmaster v. Dent
707 P.2d 319
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
in which the court noted the facts showed two unilateral mistakes existed since each party was laboring under a different interpretation of the legal effect of the contract provision in dispute.
- DVM CO. v. Stag Tobacconist, Ltd. 671 P.2d 907 Ariz. 1983
- DVM CO. v. Stag Tobacconist, Ltd. 671 P.2d 907 Ariz. 1983
- Isaak v. Massachusetts Indemnity Life Insurance 623 P.2d 11 Ariz. 1981
- Isaak v. Massachusetts Indemnity Life Insurance 623 P.2d 11 Ariz. 1981
- Lerner v. Brettschneider 598 P.2d 515 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
- Lerner v. Brettschneider 598 P.2d 515 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
- Tucker v. Byler 558 P.2d 732 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
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Tucker v. Byler
558 P.2d 732
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
In support of this contention
- Industrial Park Corp. v. U. S. I. F. Palo Verde Corp. 547 P.2d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
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Industrial Park Corp. v. U. S. I. F. Palo Verde Corp.
547 P.2d 56
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
Further, though the action in forcible detainer deals essentially with *206 the issue of possession, , we find that there is nothing which specifically limits it to that adjudication where both parties stipulated to broader relief.
- Gifford v. Makaus 540 P.2d 704 Ariz. 1975
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Gifford v. Makaus
540 P.2d 704
Ariz. 1975
We hold the trial court did not err in concluding that there was no meeting of the minds and for that reason the option to renew was void.”
- Industrial Park Corp. v. U. S. I. F. Palo Verde Corp. 507 P.2d 681 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
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Industrial Park Corp. v. U. S. I. F. Palo Verde Corp.
507 P.2d 681
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Further, though the action in forcible detainer deals essentially with the issue ■of possession, , we find that ■.there is nothing which specifically limits it .to that adjudication where both parties .stipulated to broader relief.
- Balmer v. Gagnon 504 P.2d 1278 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
- Balmer v. Gagnon 504 P.2d 1278 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
- Fridena v. Maricopa County 504 P.2d 58 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
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Fridena v. Maricopa County
504 P.2d 58
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
We further believe that, because the statutory action of forcible entry and detainer is well recognized to have been adopted to provide a summary and speedy remedy for obtaining possession of premises illegally withheld, , , the procedural language of the statute is substantive in nature and an integral part of the right itself.
- Denbo v. Badger 503 P.2d 384 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
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Denbo v. Badger
503 P.2d 384
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
“It is elementary that before there can be a binding' contract there must be mutual consent of the parties to the terms thereof.” , *428 (1962).
- Turner v. WORTH INSURANCE COMPANY 464 P.2d 990 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
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Turner v. WORTH INSURANCE COMPANY
464 P.2d 990
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
However, “there must be a distinct intention common to both and without doubt or difference and until all understand alike there can be no assent.”
- Bowen v. Sil-Flo Corporation 451 P.2d 626 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
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Bowen v. Sil-Flo Corporation
451 P.2d 626
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Cannon v. Arizona Game & Fish Commission, , and see 50 C.J.S.
- Casa Grande Trust Company v. Superior Court 444 P.2d 521 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
- Casa Grande Trust Company v. Superior Court 444 P.2d 521 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968