Cited by

(noting that appellate courts adhere to settled precedent “unless the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist or the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong”).

.” (emphasis omitted)); (to same effect).

However, stare decisis is “a doctrine of persuasion and not an iron chain of necessary conclusion,” (quoting O’), and “[t]he ease with which courts have abandoned precedent corresponds to the subject matter of the case at issue,” ¶ 38 (2003).

The doctrine of stare decisis demands that we adhere to 2 STATE v. ZAR Decision of the Court settled precedent unless the prior decision was “clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong.”

Under the doctrine of stare decisis, this court will not reject precedent unless “the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist or the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong.”

Rather, “[w]e will overturn long-standing precedent only for a compelling reason.” ¶ 52, (noting our prior case law “should be adhered to unless the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist or the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong”).

(“The fact that the construction of the statute in question rests on a single case does not render it any less the duty of this court to utilize the doctrine of stare decisis .

See Conway v. State Land Dep’t, -32 (1938); (“The primary duty of [the supreme court] is to interpret the laws of this state so that the people may know their rights.”).

ctrine of stare decisis “‘is grounded on public policy that people should know what their rights are as set out by judicial precedent and having relied on such rights in conducting their affairs should not have them done away with by judicial fiat.’” ¶ 33, (quoting White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 113, -14 (1961)); ¶ 16, (“The doctrine of stare decisis .

“[P]eople should know what their rights are as set out by judicial precedent and having relied on such rights in conducting their affairs should not have them done away with by judicial fiat.” , -14 (1961).

As we have previously noted, stare decisis “is grounded on public policy that people should know what their rights are as set out by judicial precedent and having relied on such rights in conducting their affairs should not have them done away with by judicial fiat.” White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 113, -14 (1961).

The doctrine of stare decisis “is grounded on public policy that people should know what their rights are as set out by judicial precedent and having relied on such rights in conducting their affairs should not have them done away with by judicial fiat.” , -14 (1961).

and, , the plaintiff asks this court to overrule Collier v. Stamatis, supra, if we find it impossible to distinguish it.