Cited by

See, (“The party 5 KAMMA v. GAUN Opinion of the Court who asserts a fact has the burden to establish the fact.”).

.” ()); City of Tempe v. Pilot Props., Inc., –63 (1974) (applying the consideration prong to a long-term lease of public property for use as a major league spring training complex).

(“The state may not give away public property or funds; it must receive a quid pro quo which, simply stated, means that it can enter into contracts for goods, materials, property and services.”).

¶9 A public employee’s pension rights vest “upon acceptance of employment.” Fields, 234 Ariz. at 221 ¶ 31 ().

¶12 A public employee’s pension rights vest “upon acceptance of employment.” Fields, 234 Ariz. at 221 ¶ 31 ().

¶11 Because Yeazell v. Copins , , and its progeny hold that "public employees are contractually entitled to the retirement benefits specified in their initial employment contract," Hall v. Elected Officials' Ret.

Cf. Yeazell v. Copins , , 116, ("The party who asserts a fact has the burden to establish the fact.").

See, e.g., Glazer, 237 Ariz. at 164 ¶ 13

Co., , 150 ¶ 15, (“It has long been the rule in Arizona that a valid statute is automatically part of any contract affected by it, even if the statute is not specifically mentioned in the contract.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); -14

Second, , they argued that because their pensions were part of their employment contracts that vested when they began employment, the Legislature could not unilaterally change the terms of their pensions to their detriment.

-16 , (providing that parties may substitute a new contract for the old one by mutual consent)

¶¶ 29, 36; (statutes in existence when police officer was hired were part of his employment contract); Fund Manager, Pub.

I. Yeazell and Article 29, Section 1(C) of the Arizona Constitution ¶11 P.2d 541 (1965), Arizona courts have recognized a “contract theory of retirement benefits.” Norton v. Ariz. Dep’t of Pub.

(holding that pension plans are not gifts, but part of the contemplated compensation for employee services); , (holding that a pension is not a gratuity or gift when the pension provision is part of a statute that contemplated the pension as part of the compensation for services rendered); -59 , -89 (App.1992) (holding that post-retire

¶ 15 “It has long been the rule in Arizona that a valid statute is automatically part of any contract affected by it, even if the statute is not specifically mentioned in the contract.” ¶ 11 , ( , , and Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev.

§ 15-1326 established a contract between the State and those classified as "permanent" employees of the Schools, , and various of its progeny

109, 116, see also Tucson Public Schools v. Green, 17 Ar iz.

(“Generally, the party asserting a claim for relief has the burden of proving the facts essential to his [or her] claim.”); , see also Tucson Public Schools v. Green, 17 Ariz.App.

See, , , Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev.

See McIlravy v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 119 F.3d 876, 881 (10th Cir.1997); -16 , -46 (1965) (“He who asserts the modification of a contract has the burden of proof.”); Bishop Realty v. Perk Inc., 292 S.C.

See McIlravy v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 119 F.3d 876, 881 (10th Cir.1997); -16 , -46 (1965) ("He who asserts the modification of a contract has the burden of proof."); Bishop Realty v. Perk Inc., 292 S.C.