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It is a foundational rule of statutory construction “that courts will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself,” and similarly the “court will not inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions.”

We will not read into a statute anything not within the clear intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself, nor will we “inflate, expand, stretch[,] or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions.” ().

e “is the best and most reliable index of its meaning, and where language is clear and unequivocal it is determinative of its construction.”); (“The legislature is presumed to express its meaning as clearly as possible and therefore words used in a statute are to be accorded their obvious and natural meaning.”); (we may not “inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions”); State ex rel.

¶11 Although we empathize with the unfortunate circumstances presented in this matter, we cannot “read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself.”

¶ 9 Political subdivisions, including school districts, “do not have inherent powers of eminent domain and may only exercise those powers that are statutorily delegated to them.” Id., ¶ 12; , (“[A] court will not inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions.”).

v. Donofrio, or construe a statute in a manner that will lead to absurd results.

(“[C]ourts will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself.”).3 And KCI has not articulated a legal basis for ignoring the plain language of the statute.

Furthermore, we may not “inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions,” , and we “cannot read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself.” State ex rel.

"Nor will we `inflate, expand, stretch, or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions.'" Pickrell, 98 Ariz. at 386 , 405 P.2d at 873 ( , ).

In re MH 2004-001987, ¶ 14 , ( , ).

258, ¶ 14, , 213 (App. 2005) ( , ).

(“Courts will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself.”).

Just as we do not “inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions,” , neither do we deflate, defeat, or disregard statutory terms the legislature has expressly included.

Just as we do not "inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions," , neither do we deflate, defeat, or disregard statutory terms the legislature has expressly included.

(“Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts are not warranted in reading into the law words the legislature did not choose to include.”); (“[A] court will not inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions.”); Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am.

We must not “inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions.”

¶ 37 Courts may not “inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions.”

ples.14 Were we to interpret § 12-684(A) by importing Bridgestone’s common law and policy arguments into the statute, “[s]uch an interpretation in effect [would] amend[] the statute to require proof of elements not set forth by the legislature.” Sepahi, 78 P.3d at 735; see also McIntyre Refrigeration, 165 Ariz. at 565, 799 P.2d at 906, (“‘[A] court will not inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions.’”) (alteration in McIntyre).

For example, -34 , our supreme court held that the language in § 12-1111(3) authorizing a city to exercise the right of eminent domain for “[b]uildings and grounds” did not allow the city to condemn private property for parking areas to be used in conjunction with city buildings.

407 * (court will not read into statute something not clearly within the intent as gathered from the statute).