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This rule does not render the anti-abrogation clause toothless: “[w]ithout limitation it confers the right to recover damages for injuries as existing under the common law.”

24 KAREN FANN ET AL. V. STATE OF ARIZONA ET AL. Opinion of the Court (1970).

Opinion of the Court does not limit the amount of restitution, we will not “restrict the guarantee by adding words of limitation ‘contrary to the plain language used.’” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., (refusing to limit the constitutional right to recover for damages enshrined in Article 18, section 6 of the Arizona Constitution (–20 (1970)).

Kilpatrick v. Superior Court , , 421

Comm’n, ¶ 28 (2015) (); ¶ 20 (2007) ( and A.R.S.

-53 (1953) (noting that constitutional provisions must be analyzed by “the whole of the provision and its relation to other parts of the Constitution”); (observing that “we would be compelled to construe [two sections of the Arizona constitution] together for constitutions must be construed as a whole and their various parts read together”).

¶ 10 , (“With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction.”); , (explaining that “if the sense of a word is not to be taken in its usual and commonly understood meaning except under circumstances where a different meaning is clearly intended, it becomes impossible for [people] to mean what is said or say what they mean and purposeful communication is

(“Words are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning unless it is plain or clear that a different meaning was intended.”); see also State Tax Comm’n v. Peck, , (applying the ordinary meaning of “leasing” and “renting” because “it

See Kilpatrick v. Superior Court (Miller), 10 (1970) (recognizing that “constitutions must be construed as a whole and their various parts must be read together”); State ex rel.

See Kilpatrick v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 413, 416

In Grammatico, our supreme court stated article XVIII, § 8 “addresses legal causation” and determined “the legislature may not define legal causation in a way that conflicts with [that section] because the legislature ‘cannot enact laws which will supersede constitutional provisions adopted by the people.’” ¶¶ 19, 21, 117 P.3d at 790, 791

no matter how explicit, could be saved from judicial tinkering.’ ”), , see also Bergeron ex rel.

It is true that Article 18 generally was “designed to protect the rights of the laboring class----”

¶ 28 We believe our approach gives full recognition to the principle that legislative enactments bear a strong presumption of constitutionality, see, e.g., Lapare, 154 Ariz. at 321 , 742 P.2d at 822 , and also fulfills our corresponding duty to harmonize constitutional provisions and statutes when possible, , (“Where there is doubt in the legislative language, it is the court’s duty to reconcile the language with the constitutional provision, and construe the statute in such a manner that it wil

When construing Arizona’s constitution, we must consider all of its terms, not simply the right to “freely speak.” , (“[Constitutions must be construed as a whole and their various parts must be read together.”).

The term “costs” is not defined by Rule 18, thus we must apply its “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” ( ).

(Article 18 is “designed to protect the rights of the laboring class from the evils which over the preceding century had eroded rights believed necessary to do justice between workmen and their employers.”); see also The Records of the Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910 [hereinafter

(“Words are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning unless it is plain or clear that a different meaning was intended.”); see also A.R.S.

-71 , (statutes must be interpreted in harmony with the constitution).