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A trial court retains “wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on [] cross- examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” ¶ 62 (2002) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdale, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).

Certainly, “the credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury.” ¶ 39 (2002).

The court must also consider the juvenile’s prior experience, if any, with the legal system, ¶ 59 (2002), as well as the juvenile’s “demeanor” during questioning

See State v. Cañez, ¶ 61 (2002), –03, ¶ 11, n.1 (2016) (“[I]t would require a rare case for the defendant’s own statement to be seen as prejudicial to the extent it should be excluded under Rule 403.”).

¶ 32 (2002) (“Juror prejudice will not be presumed but must be demonstrated by objective evidence.”).

¶18 Indeed, “[Arizona] precedent allows [appellate courts] to defer to an implicit finding that a reason was non-discriminatory even when the trial court did not expressly rule on the third Batson factor,” Smith, 250 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 73 (cleaned up) ( ¶¶ 63–64 (2003)); ¶ 28 (2002) (affirming the court’s implicit finding under step three in denying the Batson challenge); ¶ 70 (2015) (same), which the court of appeals in Porter acknowledged, see 248 Ariz. at 397 ¶ 16 (“[T]he trial court need not make

at 397, ¶ 16 (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 347 (2003)); ¶ 28 (2002).

was non-discriminatory” even when “the trial court did not expressly rule on [the third Batson factor].” ¶¶ 63–64, supplemented, ¶ 28 (2002) (affirming the court’s “implicit[] finding” under step three in 18 STATE V. SMITH Opinion of the Court denying the Batson challenge), (2

¶ 61 (2002); –600 (1997).

¶ 51 (2002) (reviewing suppression issue first raised on appeal for fundamental error), ¶ 11, n.1 (2016).

See, ¶ 48 (2002) (finding identification made within two days of the crime weighed in favor of reliability), superseded on other grounds, –55 (1987) (concluding there was no error in admitting identification where the “time between the crime

cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’” ¶ 36 (2005) (quoting State v. Cañez, ¶ 62 (2002)).

To be sure, the trial “court need not make detailed findings addressing all the evidence before it,” Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 347, and, in Arizona, may even conduct the entire step-three analysis implicitly in some cases, ¶ 28 (2002), 2 But in other cases, express findings are essential.

But “[p]hysical evidence is not required to sustain a conviction where the 4 STATE v. REYNA Decision of the Court totality of the circumstances demonstrates guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 42 (2002) (citation omitted).

¶ 61 (2002) (“Because the trial court is best situated to conduct the Rule 403 balance, we will reverse its ruling only for abuse of discretion.” (), superseded on other grounds by Ariz. R. Crim.

State v. Carreon , , ¶ 36, (quoting State v. Cañez , , ¶ 62, ).

Furthermore, the state “must establish that ‘pecuniary gain was a motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely the result.’” ¶ 91 (2010) (emphases added) ( ¶ 91 (2002), superseded by rule on other grounds).

See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974); State v. Cañez, ¶ 62 (2002), ¶ 11, n.1 (2016); (“The right [of confrontation] does not confer .

The superior court was in the best position to evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility, and concluded the delay was not attributable to “bad faith or maliciousness.” ¶ 28 (2002) (“We give great deference to the trial court’s ruling, based, as it is, largely upon an assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility.”)

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 347 (“[A] state court need not make detailed findings addressing all the evidence before it.”); ¶ 28 (2002) (“the trial court ruled against [defendant’s] challenge, implicitly finding that he had not carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination”)

We rejected a similar argument in State v. Cañez, ¶ 104, –03 ¶ 11 n.1, –31 (2016), and do so again.

In support of this argument

Cf. State v. Cañez, (acknowledging suppression arguments are subject to appellate review “even absent a pretrial motion to suppress”).

See State v. Cañez, (appellate court will uphold trial court’s ruling if legally correct for any reason)

-68, ¶¶ 19-20, -08 (2005); see also State v. Cañez, ¶ 70, (“[W]e will review for fundamental error even absent a pretrial motion to suppress.”), supplemented by P.3d 932 (2003), -03 n.1, ¶ 11, -31 n.1 (2016); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz

State v. Cañez, ¶ 42 (2002).

“Because the trial court is best situated to conduct the Rule 403 balance, [this court] will reverse its ruling only for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 61 (2002).

In State v. Cañez, this Court mistakenly stated that the state must prove voluntary consent "by clear and positive evidence in unequivocal words or conduct expressing consent.” , 151 ¶ 53, , 582 (2002) ( , ).

“The credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury.” ¶ 39 (2002).

lt, ¶ 60, (reviewing the admission of photographs and videotape); ¶ 5, (reviewing the admission of text messages over a hearsay objection); (reviewing the preclusion of expert witness testimony); see also State v. Cañez, ¶ 61, (“Because the trial court is best situated to conduct the Rule 403 balance, we will reverse its ruling only for abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted)), supplemented by P.3d 932 (2003), and abrogation on other grounds recognized by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798

“Because the trial court is best situated to conduct the Rule 403 balance, we will reverse its ruling only for abuse of discretion.” State v. Cañez

State v. Cañez, ¶ 62, (“A defendant’s fundamental right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is ‘limited to the presentation of matters admissible under ordinary evidentiary rules, including relevance.’” (quoting State v.

Defendant asserts that no physical evidence supports the convictions, only testimony from the victims, but “[p]hysical evidence is not required to sustain a conviction where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 42 (2002).

See State v. Cañez, ¶ 61 (2002).

¶ 9 (App. 2009) ( ¶ 51 (2002)).