Cited by

son challenges are assessed in three stages: “(1) the party challenging the strikes must make a prima facie showing of discrimination; (2) the striking party must provide a race- neutral reason for the strike; and (3) if a race-neutral explanation is provided, the trial court must determine whether the challenger has carried its burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination.” State v. Cañez, ¶ 22 (2002).

Any limitation on cross-examination is evaluated “on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the defendant was denied the opportunity to present evidence relevant to issues in the case or the witness' credibility.” State v. Cañez, ¶ 62

“The credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury.” ¶ 39 (2002).

State v. Cañez, ¶ 51 (2002).

In addition, “[p]hysical evidence is not required to sustain a conviction where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 42 (2002); see Fulminante, -94, ¶ 26.

¶ 51, (holding trial court’s ruling will be upheld if legally correct for any reason supported by the record).

Garcia, 224 Ariz. at 10, 226 P.3d at 379 ( ¶ 22, ).

¶16 Moreover, although there was no physical evidence to support the charges, physical evidence “is not required to sustain a conviction where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 42, (“In child molestation cases, the defendant can be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.”); (conviction may rest on unco

(addressing issues identified in state’s brief); ¶¶ 6-9 , -14 (App.2012) (reaching good-faith question when argument squarely raised on appeal).

See, e.g., Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114–16; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–201; Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442–43 (1969); Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385–86; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987); see also State v. Cañez, ¶ 48, Lehr, 201 Ariz. at 521 ¶¶ 49–51, 38 P.3d at 1184; –75, –5 (1980); Dessureault, 104 Ariz. at 384–85, 453 P.2d at 955–56.

Even when a question seeks relevant evidence, the superior court may reasonably limit cross- examination “based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” State v. Cañez, (quotation omitted); accord Ariz. R. Evid.

¶ 37, (internal citation omitted).

A trial court’s limitation on cross-examination is evaluated “on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the defendant was denied the opportunity to present evidence relevant to issues in the case or the witness’[s] credibility.” State v. Cañez, ¶ 62

“Single person identifications are inherently suggestive,” but are nevertheless admissible “if the identification is reliable notwithstanding the suggestiveness,”

See, e.g., State v. Cañez, ¶ 39, see also Ariz. R. Crim.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, “[w]e give great deference to the trial court’s ruling, based, as it is, largely upon an assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility.” State v. Cañez, ¶ 28

¶ 39, (“[T]he credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury.”).

¶ 62, (citation omitted); ¶ 29, (“Credibility and weight are for determination by the jury unassisted by the judge.” (quoting State v. Sanchez, 400 S.E.2d 421, 424 (N.C.

Rather, the state must prove that pecuniary gain was a “motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely the result.” ¶ 91, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lynch, 225 Ariz. at 40 ¶ 70, 234 P.3d at 608.

State v. Cañez, (“The right to cross-examination must be kept within ‘reasonable’ bounds and the trial court has discretion to curtail its scope.”).

-50 ¶ 85, -45 (2004); State v. Cañez (Cañez I), ¶ 30

1, 2, (conflicts in testimony do not render evidence insufficient); , (according “great deference” to trial court’s resolution of conflicting psychological evidence offered by experts).

“This proof may be either by ‘tangible evidence or strong circumstantial inference.’” State v. Cañez, ¶ 91, (quoting Hyde, 186 Ariz. at 280, 921 P.2d at 683).

___U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 727; see also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (“The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned.”), overruled on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987); State v. Cañez, (“Single person identifications are inherently suggestive.”); (concluding “one-man show-ups are inherently suggestive”); -68, -71 (1982) (“[S]uggestiveness is inherent in

The Court concluded that it “cannot allow the creation of exigent circumstances in order to circumvent the warrant requirement.” Id.; see also State v. Cañez, ¶ 56, (following Ault).

see also State v. Cañez, (“[W]e are obliged to uphold the trial court’s ruling if legally correct for any reason.”); (reviewing court may affirm summary dismissal with prejudice when record “demonstrably require[s] it”).

“We give great deference to the trial court’s ruling, based, as it is, largely upon an assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility.” ¶ 28

In State v. Cañez, for example, the defendant “attempted to strangle [the victim], stabbed him six times, and delivered 21 blunt force injuries, ten of them to the head.” ¶ 106

See State v. Cañez, ¶ 37, (“The method and scope of voir dire is left to the discretion of the trial judge.”).6 D. Admissibility of Interrogation ¶21 Police arrested Cota on January 6, 2004, at about 5:30 p.m.

¶ 51 , (recognizing that appellate court can affirm superior court if correct for any reason).