Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Cañez, 42 P.3d 564.

170 citing documents.

State v. Abdi 248 P.3d 209 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State v. Abdi 248 P.3d 209 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State v. Gallardo 242 P.3d 159 Ariz. 2010
State v. Gallardo 242 P.3d 159 Ariz. 2010
party challenging the strikes must make a prima facie showing of discrimination; (2) the striking party must provide a race-neutral reason for the strike; and (3) if a race-neutral explanation is provided, the trial court must determine whether the challenger has carried its burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination.” State v. Cañez, ¶ 22
State v. Ahumada 241 P.3d 908 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State v. Ahumada 241 P.3d 908 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State of Arizona v. Glenda Lorraine Rumsey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State of Arizona v. Glenda Lorraine Rumsey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State v. Hummons 236 P.3d 1201 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
See id,.; , (on appeal, trial court’s ruling on motion to suppress upheld if legally correct for any reason).
State v. Villalobos 235 P.3d 227 Ariz. 2010
State v. Villalobos 235 P.3d 227 Ariz. 2010
State v. GUNCHES 234 P.3d 590 Ariz. 2010
State v. GUNCHES 234 P.3d 590 Ariz. 2010
to kill the victim, not to engage in violence beyond that necessary to kill.” Wallace, 219 Ariz. at 8 ¶ 37, 191 P.3d at 171 (quoting State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 355 ¶ 123, ); see, e.g., State v. Cañez, -62 ¶ 106, -93 (2002) (finding no gratuitous violence because defendant “merely escalated his attacks until he succeeded in killing [victim]”).
State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
ation; (2) the striking party must provide a race- neutral reason for the strike; and (3) if a race-neutral explanation is provided, the trial court must determine whether the challenger has carried its burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination.” State v. Cañez, ¶ 22
In Re Mh 2008-002596 219 P.3d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
In Re Mh 2008-002596 219 P.3d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
This standard is “proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the issue sought to be proved.” State v. Cañez, ¶ 76 , ( , )
State v. Canales 217 P.3d 836 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
(appellate court may affirm trial court if correct for any reason).
Carrillo v. Houser 214 P.3d 444 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
4 ¶ 53 , , (“In determining whether or not there was a consent, it is necessary that such a waiver or consent be proved by clear and positive evidence in unequivocal words or conduct expressing consent, and it must be established
State v. Childress 214 P.3d 422 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State of Arizona v. Lemon Montrea Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
See, -17 (2007); -12 (2005); -50 (2003); State v. Cañez, ¶¶ 29-30, -26 (1999).
State v. Wallace 191 P.3d 164 Ariz. 2008
State v. Wallace 191 P.3d 164 Ariz. 2008
¶ 67, State v. Cañez, ¶ 109, 4 Were the crimes committed today, the multiple homicides aggravator could also be alleged for each murder.
State v. Bocharski 189 P.3d 403 Ariz. 2008
State v. Bocharski 189 P.3d 403 Ariz. 2008
See State v. Cañez, ¶ 109, (finding that helplessness and senselessness alone are not enough).
State v. Aguilar 178 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Aguilar 178 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
See State v. Cañez, , (“we are obliged to uphold the trial court’s ruling if legally correct for any reason”)
State v. Rojers 169 P.3d 651 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Rojers 169 P.3d 651 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
¶ 17 Additionally, as to the motion to suppress, all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of upholding the court’s factual determinations, ¶ 9 , and “we are obligated to uphold the trial court’s ruling if legally correct for any reason.” State v. Cañez, ¶ 51
State v. Pandeli 161 P.3d 557 Ariz. 2007
State v. Pandeli 161 P.3d 557 Ariz. 2007
See State v. Cañez, ¶ 67, (finding no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence that was both minimally probative and minimally prejudicial).
State v. Tucker 160 P.3d 177 Ariz. 2007
E.g., State v. Cañez, ¶ 120
State of Arizona v. Anthony Shariff Gay Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
But the fact that four African-Americans served as either jurors or alternates is “‘indicative of a nondiscriminatory motive.’” State v. Cañez, 202 Ariz. 133, ¶ 23
State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
“We give great deference to the trial court’s ruling, based, as it is, largely upon an assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility.” State v. Cañez, ¶ 28
State v. Newell 132 P.3d 833 Ariz. 2006
State v. Cromwell 119 P.3d 448 Ariz. 2005
State v. Cromwell 119 P.3d 448 Ariz. 2005
State v. Cañez, ¶ 100, ¶¶ 34-35
State of Arizona v. Kenneth Allen May Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State of Arizona v. Kenneth Allen May Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
9 -90 (2002) (pursuant to Rule 803(19), son of murder victim allowed to testify to his father’s birth date and age; victim’s age can be proven by “testimony of people who knew him”); see generally 5 John Henry Wigmore & James H. Chadbourn, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1486(a) (1974) (“as
State v. Roseberry 111 P.3d 402 Ariz. 2005
State v. Roseberry 111 P.3d 402 Ariz. 2005
- 18 - result.’” State v. Cañez, ¶ 91, ( ¶ 32, ).
State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
See, , 441 ¶ 49, State v. Cañez, , 156 ¶¶ 75-76
State v. Carreon 107 P.3d 900 Ariz. 2005
State v. Carreon 107 P.3d 900 Ariz. 2005
cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” State v. Cañez, , 153 ¶ 62, (citation omitted).
State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
¶ 52 , State v. Cañez, ¶ 37
State of Arizona v. Shipman Sweeney Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State of Arizona v. Shipman Sweeney Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004