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¶37 Prejudice will only be presumed when the publicity “was so extensive or outrageous that it permeated the proceedings or created a carnival-like atmosphere.” Payne, 233 Ariz. at 499 ¶ 28 ( ¶ 14 (2003)).

¶ 120 (2004) (explaining that evidentiary objections waived if raised for the first time on appeal); ¶ 41 (2003) (holding challenge to ruling excluding evidence was “waived” because defendant “never presented the trial court with a legal basis for admitting” the excluded evidence).

Likewise, “[m]ere advice from the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.” ¶ 29 (2003) (“Mere advice that it would be better to be truthful is a permissible interrogation tactic.”); Huerstel, ¶ 55 (2003) (“[S]uch advice [to tell the truth] from the police when unaccompanied by either a threat or promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.”(quotation

We review the court’s ruling, or lack thereof, for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 22 (2012), and will not disturb it absent a finding of clear and manifest error, ¶ 26 (2003).

However, a defendant’s cognitive deficiencies “are generally not relevant to a determination of voluntariness unless the police knew or should have known about them.” ¶ 31 (2003).

¶¶ 27, 29 (2003); (finding that statements such as “[i]t’s nothing that can’t be worked out” and “to lie isn’t going to help” were the detective’s opinions and not an express or implied promise).

¶ 34, (reviewing a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence for “a clear, prejudicial abuse of discretion” (citations omitted)).

¶32 Although this Court has dealt with expert testimony relating to the voluntariness of confessions, –38 ¶¶ 33–38, –86 (2003) (evaluating whether the trial court “prevented [the expert] from rendering a final opinion as to whether the confession was voluntary”); Hyde, 186 Ariz. at 275–76, 921 P.2d at 678–79 (evaluating expert testimony regarding the “defendant’s mental condition when he made his sta

State v. Blakely, 204 Ariz. 3 STATE v. HARRISON Decision of the Court 429, 437, ¶ 34

4 STATE v. KUDER Decision of the Court Ariz. 429, 434, ¶ 13, and “review[s] de novo matters involving interpretation of court rules,” ¶ 10

See, e.g., Cruz, 218 Ariz. at 157 ¶ 18, 181 P.3d at 204 (finding no presumed prejudice when publicity occurred more than a year before trial and was almost entirely accurate); ¶ 15, (refusing to presume prejudice when local inflammatory news stories appeared primarily at the time of the crime or in pretrial stages); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 563–64, 858 P.2d at 1166–67 (finding news containing inadmissible or inaccurate evidence did not create presumed prejudice when th

To show presumed prejudice, a defendant must show that the publicity “was so extensive or outrageous that it permeated the proceedings or created a carnival-like atmosphere.” ¶ 14, (internal quotation marks omitted) ( ).

¶25 P.3d 77 (2003), Lehr next contends that the State's discussion of Rule 404(b) factors in its closing remarks changed the theory of prosecution and violated due process because he did not have a chance to respond to the expanded use of the other acts evidence.