Cited by

(degree of expert’s qualifications goes to weight of testimony, not its admissibility).

“Substantial evidence is that which reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 87

¶12 Juror misconduct necessitates “a new trial only if ‘the defense shows actual prejudice or if prejudice may be fairly presumed from the facts.’” State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 208 ¶ 58, ( ) (emphasis and internal citation omitted).

Actual Prejudice ¶ 20 If prejudice cannot be presumed, a defendant instead must show “the pretrial publicity was actually prejudicial and likely deprived him of a fair trial.” Cruz, , 181 P.3d at 204

¶18 On the other hand, “[w]hen reasonable minds may differ on inferences drawn from the facts, the case must be submitted to the jury, and the trial judge has no discretion to enter a judgment of acquittal.” P.2d at 1272

Standard of review ¶22 Generally, “[m]atters of courtroom security are left to the discretion of the trial court.” ¶ 84

“Sentencing determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion,” but we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.

It “applies to action by state officers under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” ¶ 23, (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).

Like the determination whether a statement was knowing and intelligent, “[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.”

“Substantial evidence is that which reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 87 , (citation omitted).

¶ 50, (“The critical inquiry is the 21 ¶47 The trial court denied Kiles’ motion.

The degree of qualification goes to the weight given the testimony, not its admissibility.” , 210 ¶ 70, (citation omitted).

b. Actual prejudice ¶21 In the absence of presumed prejudice, a defendant may demonstrate “that the pretrial publicity was actually prejudicial and likely deprived him of a fair trial.” ¶ 49

¶ 8 “Jury coercion exists when the trial court’s actions or remarks, viewed in the totality of the circumstances, displaced the independent judgment of the jurors, or when the trial judge encourages a deadlocked jury to reach a verdiet[.]” ¶ 94 , (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

But, “[t]he degree of qualification, goes to the weight given the *353 testimony, not its admissibility.” ¶ 70

When assessing the admissibility of photographs, we “consider the photographs’ relevance, the likelihood that the photographs will incite the jurors’ passions, and the photographs’ probative value compared to their prejudicial impact.” McGill, 213 Ariz. at 154, ¶ 30, 140 P.3d at 937 ( ¶ 60, ).

¶¶ 97-109, -81 (2004) (discussing Eighth Amendment challenge to § 13-501’s lack of transfer hearing requirement in tandem with defendant’s Eighth Amendment challenge to death sentence).