Cited by

(permitting sentence enhancement despite the state's filing error because the defendant had actual notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment); ¶ 17 (2003) ("Because [the defendant] had actual, although oral, notice of the prosecutor's intent to use the aggravated assault conviction as a prior serious offense aggravating circumstance and the delay caused him no prejudice, the State adequately noticed the prior serious conviction aggravating circumstance

To overcome this presumption, Father must prove the court harbored “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will, or undue friendship or favoritism.” ¶ 22 (citation omitted), supplemented by

To overcome this presumption, Mother must prove the court harbored “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will, or undue friendship or favoritism, towards one of the litigants.” ¶ 22 (citation omitted), supplemented by

To overcome this presumption, Father must prove the court harbored “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will, or undue friendship or favoritism.” ¶ 22 (citation omitted), supplemented by

He further argues the court’s denial of his motions “evince animus towards the defense.” ¶24 We generally presume a trial court to be “free of bias and prejudice.” ¶ 22 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 28 (2016); ¶¶ 19-20 (2003).

¶ 22 (2003) ( ¶ 11 (1999)) (“A party challenging a trial judge’s impartiality must overcome a strong presumption that trial judges are ‘free of bias and prejudice.’”).

[when] the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.”5 ¶20 A party asserting judicial bias must overcome a strong presumption that trial judges are free from bias and prejudice and “prov[e] ‘a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will, or undue friendship or favoritism, towards one of the litigants.’” ¶ 22 (2003) ().

I. ¶ 2 We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts, , 182 ¶ 2

–85, ¶ 16 (2003) (holding that the failure to provide written notice of aggravating circumstances, as required in capital cases, was not reversible error when the defendant had actual notice).

¶¶ 19-20, (holding that a capital defendant cannot collaterally attack in the capital case the validity of a prior conviction from another case, but rather must do so directly through post-conviction relief procedures in the other case).

To overcome this presumption, a party must prove “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will, or undue friendship or favoritism, towards one of the litigants.” ¶ 22, supplemented by P.3d 424 (2003).

The Winskis have not proved that the judge had “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will, or undue friendship or favoritism, towards one of the litigants.” ¶ 22

To overcome this presumption, a party must prove “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will, or undue friendship or favoritism, towards one of the litigants.” ¶ 22, supplemented by P.3d 424 (2003).

¶ 2, supplemented by P.3d 424 (2003).

Cf. State v. Cropper, 205 Ariz. 181, 184 ¶ 15, (holding that State’s failure to provide written notice of 28 intended aggravating factor under prior version of Rule 15.1 was not reversible error wh

See State v. Cropper (Cropper I), -84 ¶ 12

(trial judge strongly presumed to be free from bias and prejudice); (“If confronted with a challenge for cause in which the facts do not clearly establish whether a prospective juror should be removed, the better practice wi

supp. op., 206 Ariz. 153