Cited by

See Solis, 236 Ariz. at 288, ¶ 14 (error harmless in part because court instructed jury to disregard those instructions rendered inapplicable by the evidence); ¶ 9 (2004) (error not harmless when a reasonable jury "could differently assess the evidence").

See, ¶¶ 34-36 (2004) (finding that while securing witness testimony by negotiating a "last-minute plea agreement affected Armstrong's trial strategy, such damage does not of itself signal prosecutorial bad faith"); (prejudice not demonstrated by speculation that witnesses

¶ 29 (2014) ( ¶ 40 (2004)).

d with Juarez both before and after B.J.’s time in prison ¶10 “The criteria for determining whether remarks by a prosecutor require reversal are (1) whether the prosecutor’s actions called jurors’ attention to matters the jury was not justified in considering in determining its verdict and (2) the probability that the jurors were in fact influenced by the remarks.” ¶ 61 (2004).

An abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” State v. 4 ¶ 40, supplemented by P.3d 1076 (2004).

–54, ¶ 40 (2004); Moody, 208 Ariz. at 457–58, ¶ 135.

–54, ¶ 40 (2004); ¶ 5 (App. 2014).

¶¶ 38–39, (holding that the State did not violate Rule 15.1 when it made a belated disclosure as a result of the witness’s last minute decision to enter into a plea agreement in exchange for her testimony).

An abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 40

In reviewing a trial court’s choice and imposition of sanctions under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.7, we will find an abuse of discretion only when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 40

“By the rule of invited error, one who deliberately leads the court to take certain action may not upon appeal assign that action as error.” , , 357 n. 7, ¶ 59, , 1073 n. 7 (2004) (stating that the invited error doctrine exists to prevent a party from injecting error into the record and then profiting from that error on appeal).

(“[O]ne who deliberately leads the court to take certain action may not upon appeal assign that action as error.”); , 357 n. 7, ¶ 59, , 1073 n. 7 (2004) (invited error doctrine prevents party from injecting trial error and profiting from it on appeal).

357 n. 7, ¶ 59, , 1073 n. 7 (2004) (stating that the invited error doctrine exists to prevent a party from injecting error into the record and then profiting from that error on appeal).

357 n. 7, ¶ 59, , 1073 n. 7 (2004) (stating that the invited error doctrine exists to prevent a party from injecting error into the record and then profiting from that error on appeal).

“By the rule of invited error, one who deliberately leads the court to take certain action may not upon appeal assign that action as error.” , , 357 n. 7, ¶ 59, , 1073 n. 7 (2004) (stating that the invited error doctrine exists to prevent a party from injecting error into the record and then profiting from that error on appeal).

¶ 23 , (fundamental error); , 357 n. 7, ¶ 59, , 1073 n. 7 (2004) (invited error).

See State v. Armstrong (Armstrong II), -65 ¶ 11, -81 (2004).

-58 ¶¶ 60-64, -74 (2004) (noting that without more, acrimonious and inappropriate remarks outside the presence of the jury do not warrant reversal).

The rule is intended “to give full notification *115 of each side’s ease-in-chief so as to avoid unnecessary delay and surprise at trial.” Roque, 213 Ariz. at 207, ¶ 32 , 141 P.3d at 382 ( ¶ 38 , ).

5 ¶9 As our supreme court has explained, “Generally, ‘[t]he [S]tate cannot be held to disclose material that it does not possess.’” (alterations in Armstrong).

State v. Armstrong (Armstrong I), ¶ 74

“This factor is satisfied only ‘if the expectation of pecuniary gain is a motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely a result of the murder.’” ¶ 7, ( ).