Cited by

ned in State v. Villalobos, a “jury cannot be precluded from hearing mitigation evidence because it lacks a causal nexus to the murder,” but once the jury has heard all mitigation evidence, “‘there is no constitutional prohibition against the State arguing that evidence is not particularly relevant or that it is entitled to little weight.’” ¶ 38 (2010) ( ¶ 97 (2005)).

We will reverse if “(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [Zamora] a fair trial.” ¶ 45 (2005); see Murray, 250 Ariz. at 548, ¶ 12 (“Prosecutorial misconduct broadly encompasses any conduct that infringes on a defendant’s constitutional rights .

¶ 6 (App. 2014) ( ¶ 60 (2005)).

See, ¶ 28 (2005) (citing cases); Jimenez, 255 Ariz. at 554 ¶ 13; (similar).

To that end, a defendant must demonstrate that “(1) [error] exists and (2) ‘a reasonable likelihood exists that the [error] could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.’” ¶ 46 (2007) ( ¶ 45 (2005)).

¶17 “Even a juror with preconceived notions about the defendant’s guilt need not be excused if he or she agrees to decide the case based only on the evidence.”

¶15 We also find no clear prejudice underlying Juror 8’s statement that he had “no idea” at that moment whether Jimenez was “a pedophile.” So long as a prospective juror agrees to decide the case only on the evidence presented at trial, “[e]ven a juror with preconceived notions about the defendant’s guilt need not be excused.”

¶33 Daniel contends he was deprived of a fair trial by the State’s “course of intentional misconduct.” “We will reverse a conviction because of prosecutorial [error] if misconduct is present and ‘a reasonable likelihood exists that [it] could have affected the jury’s verdict.’” ¶ 74 (2008) ( 8 STATE v. DANIEL Decision of the Court ¶ 45 (2005)).

Any photograph of a deceased victim in a murder case is relevant “because the fact and cause of death are always relevant in a murder prosecution.” ¶ 39 (2005).

at 83 ¶ 38 ( ¶ 97 63 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court (2005)); see also State v. Pandeli (Pandeli I), ¶ 32 (2007) (approving a prosecutor’s comments because “the State never told jurors that they could not

We will reverse a conviction due to prosecutorial error only if “(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.” Smith, 250 Ariz. at 99 ¶ 138 ( ¶ 45 (2005)).

(quoting State v. Anderson (Anderson II), ¶ 45 (2005)).

1 is a lesser-included offense of ‘a second or subsequent’ aggravated harassment offense as charged in Count 2.” “[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.”

(quoting State v. Anderson (Anderson II), ¶ 45 (2005)).

¶ 87 (2005) (holding that "use of a second jury during the aggravation and penalty phases does not constitute double jeopardy"); ¶ 27 (2003) (noting that, except for in capital sentencing proceedings, "[d]ouble jeopardy principles generally do not apply to sentencing proceeding

We will reverse Smith’s conviction because of prosecutorial error if: “(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.” supplemented, (quoting State v. Atwood, 171 35 STATE V. SMITH Opinion of the Court Ariz. 576, 606 (1992)).