Cited by

See Logan, 200 Ariz. at 566 ¶ 11; ¶ 20, 344 ¶¶ 66–67 (2005) (finding defendant invited error by specifically requesting erroneous jury instructions and verdict forms); ¶ 111 (2004) (finding a party invited error where he elicited the testimony in question).

¶ 6 (App. 2014); ¶ 60 (2005).

that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.’” Hulsey, 243 Ariz. at 388 ¶ 89 (–41 ¶ 45 (2005)).

(finding no improper comment on the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right where the prosecutor’s comments came in response to the defendant’s allocution), and were based on evidence in the record, ¶ 97 (2005) (allowing the prosecutor to comment that evidence was “not particularly relevant” or “entitled to little weight”).

¶ 19, n.6 (2005) (noting that jury verdicts can moot any possibility of non-unanimity).

¶ 44 (2013); ¶ 60 (2005).

¶ 43 (2017) ( ¶ 68 (2006), ¶ 50 (2005)).

Because Muldrow objected during both the examination of the expert and closing argument

To reverse, prosecutorial misconduct must be present, and a “reasonable likelihood [must] exist[] that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying the defendant a fair trial.” Martinez, 230 Ariz. at 214 ¶ 24 ( ¶ 45 (2005)).

See State v. Anderson , , ¶ 139, , 399 (2005) (no double-jeopardy violation where each crime "of which [defendant] was convicted requires proof of elements not included in the others").

Sanders’ argument was previously addressed by this Court in State v. Anderson (Anderson II), –53 ¶¶ 109–14, 13

¶ 52 (2005) (superior court’s correct instruction on law and admonition that lawyers’ arguments were not evidence negated error based on prosecutor’s clear misstatements of law); see also Fish, 222 Ariz. at 114, ¶ 8.

“The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” ¶ 139 (2005).

That is, Francois must show that “(1) misconduct exists and (2) ‘a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [Francois] a fair trial.’” ¶ 46 (2007) (quoting State v. Anderson (Anderson II), ¶ 45 (2005)).

–38 ¶¶ 25–26 (2005) (“The Sixth Amendment forbids excusing potential jurors for cause solely because of their general objections to the death penalty.” (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968))).

at ¶¶ 14–15; –36, ¶¶ 13–18 (2005) (defendant who failed to make pretrial objection to allegedly duplicitous indictment waived argument).

¶ 54 (2005) ("A defendant need not personally use or threaten to use the deadly weapon if an accomplice does so.").

¶10 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that ‘(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.’” ¶ 145 (2004) (citation omitted); ¶ 45 (2005).

-42, ¶¶ 49-52, -84 (2005) (holding State’s misstatement of the law was not fundamental error because the superior court properly instructed the jury, indicated the instruction was the law that applied to the hearing, and instructed the jury that the lawyers’ statements were not evidence).

go states that “[t]he rationale underlying Caldwell applies equally well to these facts.” ¶40 “Caldwell, however, merely held that a death sentence could not stand ‘when the sentencing jury is led to believe that responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rests not with the jury but with the appellate court which later reviews the case.’” ¶ 22, (quoting Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323) (emphasis removed); see also Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994) (noting Caldwell ap

( ¶ 45, ) (citation omitted).

¶ 40, (stating that photographs must not be introduced “for the sole purpose of inflaming the jury” ( )).