Cited by

without having committed the lesser one.”

A duplicitous indictment “charges two or more distinct offenses in a single count.”

As applied, among other things, Miller must show: “(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 45, (citation omitted).

P. 12.9, 13.5(e), 16.1(b); -36, ¶¶ 16-17, -78 (2005) (“We require pretrial objections to an indictment in order to allow correction of any alleged defects before trial begins.”); -40, ¶ 31, -35 (2004) (“[A]ll challenges to a grand jury’s findings of probable cause must be

¶9 Finally, “Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5(e) provides that ‘no issue concerning a defect in the charging document shall be raised other than by a motion filed in accordance with Rule 16.’ Rule 16.1(b) requires that such motions be filed at least twenty days before the trial; Rule 16.1(c), in turn, provides that any motion not timely filed is ‘precluded.’” -36, ¶ 16, -78, supplemented by P.3d 1219 (2005).

¶¶ 100-01, (defendant must argue specific prejudice when alleging violation of right to allocution before imposition of death sentence).

-36, ¶¶ 15- 17, -78 (2005) (holding failure to object to alleged defects in indictment before trial waived any objection); (holding defendant invited any error in denial of motion to remand where motion denied as moot at defenda

¶ 45, (stating that this court will reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct when there is misconduct by the prosecutor and “a reasonable likelihood [] that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial” (citations omitted)).

] by adding [her] own ‘explanations and comments.’ ”

¶13 To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must establish that “‘(1) misconduct is indeed present[,] and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.’” -83 (2005)

(pretrial objection to charging document required); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

This Court “has repeatedly held that a conviction for felony murder predicated on robbery or armed robbery does not automatically prove the (F)(5) aggravator.” ¶ 103

ry sought to reach a “reasoned, moral judgment about which sentence [was] justified and appropriate.” ¶¶ 67–68, (holding that 11 jury instructions negated improper comments of prosecutor); ¶ 50, (holding that jury instructions cured the prosecutor's misstatement of the law).

7 327, ¶¶ 16-17, -78 (2005).4 The defect marking a duplicitous indictment is, by definition, apparent from its text, meaning it might not deprive a defendant of the “fundamental right to reasonable notice of the criminal acts charged against him,” (1

cutorial misconduct warrants reversal if “(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.” State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 340 ¶ 45, (internal quotation omitted).

State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 24 327, 347

r only if (1) misconduct exists and (2) ‘a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.’” State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 335 ¶ 46, (quoting State v. Anderson (Anderson II), ¶ 54, ).

State v. Anderson (“Anderson II”), ¶ 39

State v. Anderson (Anderson II), ¶¶ 79-80, 82

-90, ¶¶ 38–45, –57 (2005), and State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 353, ¶ 114

Although we review for an abuse of discretion whether the trial court erred in giving or refusing to give requested jury instructions, , we review de novo whether the instruction it gave correctly states the law