Cited by

But see Morris, 215 Ariz. at 335 ¶ 47 (“[A]n incident may nonetheless contribute to a finding of persistent and pervasive misconduct if the cumulative effect of the incidents shows that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.” ( ¶ 155 (2006))).

See Murray, 250 Ariz. at 548 ¶ 13; ¶ 132 (2006) (“Because the jury may consider 28 STATE OF ARIZONA V. EDWARD LITTLETON MCCAULEY Opinion of the Court victims’ statements in making its sentencing decision, the prosecutor may discuss them in his closing argument.”).

17 ¶ 47 (2007) ( ¶ 155 (2006)) (cleaned up).

-11, ¶¶ 49–52 (2006), ¶¶ 11–15 (2017).

¶27 “Because the jury may consider victims’ statements in making its sentencing decision, the prosecutor may discuss them in his closing argument.” ¶ 132 (2006), see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (holding a prosecutor may use victim impact statements to argue for death); –92 ¶¶ 108–11 (2018) (holding prosecutor’s recit

Similarly, ¶¶ 157-59 (2006), our supreme court concluded that a prosecutor had committed error by asking a question that inserted her opinion about the validity of a psychiatric test.

See, ¶ 21 (2006) (); ¶ 36 (App. 2013).

‘to prejudice the defendant.’” Morris, 215 Ariz. at 335, ¶ 47 ( ¶ 155 (2006), abrogated on other grounds by Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. at 267).

To prevail, Daniel “must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make [his] conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 152 (2006) ( ¶ 26 (1998), ).

We review a superior court’s “assessment of the adequacy of disclosure for an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 21 (2006), ¶¶ 13–15 (2017).

ssion of “a videotaped interview in which a detective repeat[s] statements allegedly made by a non-testifying witness against the defendant” does not violate the Confrontation Clause when the statements are “used merely as a method of interrogation” and the jury understands they are not intended to prove “the truth of the matters asserted.” Boggs, 218 Ariz. at 334 ¶ 33 (–14 ¶¶ 69–70 (2006), abrogated 12 ).

¶ 15 (2006) (“Antipathy toward the police alone may constitute a valid reason to strike jurors when the State’s case relies on police testimony.”), abrogated on other grounds by Escalante-Orozco, supra.

¶ 12 (2006), ¶¶ 13-14 (2017); ¶ 16 (App. 2012) (“By asking the prosecutor for a race-neutral explanation for the strike, the judge implicitly found that defendant had met his initial burden to m

¶ 12 (2006), ¶¶ 13-14 (2017).

¶21 “In evaluating the propriety of a prosecutor’s argument, this court analyzes whether the remarks called to the jurors’ attention matters that they should not consider, and whether, ‘under the circumstances of the particular case, [the remarks] probably influenced’ the jurors.” ¶ 128 (2006) ( abrogated on other grounds, abrogated on other grounds by Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 140 ¶¶ 15–16).

We review the sufficiency of the evidence "only to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, 'viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.'" ¶ 22 (2007) ( ¶ 93 (2006), ).

“We defer to the trial court’s ruling, which is based ‘largely upon an assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility.’” Garcia, 224 Ariz. at 10 ¶ 22 ( ¶ 12 (2006)).

¶44 In arguing for leniency, Poyson likens his case to three decisions where we reduced the death sentence to a life sentence: Bocharski; and Richmond.

¶ 155 (2006) (quotations and citations omitted).

¶ 155 (2006) (stating that ”even if there was no error .

is a question of law that we review de novo, while we review the judge’s 8 STATE v. HAMILTON Decision of the Court assessment of the adequacy of disclosure for an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 21 (2006), (abrogated on other grounds) (internal citations omitted).

¶32 Even when individual acts of prosecutorial misconduct are harmless, their cumulative effect may demonstrate “that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.” ¶ 155 (2006) (internal quotation omitted), ¶¶ 11–15 (2017).

In reviewing Johnson’s claim, we “review[] the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.” ¶ 93 (2006).

¶14 Nonetheless, even when individual acts of prosecutorial misconduct are harmless, the cumulative effect of the incidents may demonstrate “that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.” ¶ 155 (2006) (internal quotation omitted), ¶¶ 11-15 (2017).