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stitutional vagueness.5 5 Andriano’s brief also seems to claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that the murder was “especially cruel.” Because we would review sufficiency of the evidence to “determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury[’s] verdict,” ¶ 93, and affirm the jury’s finding if the evidence is such that “reasonable persons could accept [it] as adequate and suffic

See, e.g., State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 204 ¶ 17, (discussing importance of determining whether a prospective juror “will be able to follow the law”).

or bring in witnesses’ to establish the [nature of the prior] offense.” quoting Schaaf, 169 Ariz. at 334, 819 P.2d at 920.

3 at 1369 n.9; -97 (2006) (where “victims made their statements in court and stood subject to cross-examination, no confrontation issues arose”).

(“Antipathy toward the police alone may constitute a valid reason to strike jurors when the State’s case relies on police testimony.”); Newell, 132 P.3d at 845-46 (decision to strike juror for “contradictory responses about whether [the juror] could vote to impos

§ 13-703(F)(2)); -17 ¶¶ 82-88, -92 (2006) (refusing to “look beyond the language of the [foreign] statutes” to the complaint describing the defendant’s conduct in determining whether prior California robbery conviction constituted a “serious offense” under A.R.S.