Cited by

¶14 In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim under the abuse of discretion standard, we “review[] the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.” ¶ 93

In conducting independent review, “we consider the quality and the strength, not simply the number, of aggravating and mitigating factors.” ¶ 166, ( ¶ 60, ).

¶22 “We review a trial court’s decision regarding the State’s motives for a peremptory strike for clear error.” ¶ 12

¶ 170, (applying penalty doubt standard on independent review).

¶ 137 , ¶ 53 , , 336 n. 5, 337, ¶¶ 18, 20, , 378 n. 5, 379 (2005); ¶ 19

In conducting such review, we “consider the quality and the strength, not simply the number, of aggravating and mitigating factors.” ¶ 166, ( ¶ 60, ).

Propriety of Death Sentence ¶137 In reviewing the propriety of the death sentence, “‘we consider the quality and the strength, not simply the number, of aggravating and mitigating factors.’” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 230 ¶ 166, (quoting State v. 54 Greene, ¶ 60, ).

“[E]ven if there was no error or an error was harmless and so by itself does not warrant reversal, an incident may nonetheless contribute to a finding of persistent and pervasive misconduct.” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 228 ¶ 155, (citation omitted).

¶16 We review a sufficiency of the evidence claim by determining “whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.” ¶ 93, (citing State v. Roseberry, 210 Ariz. 360, 368-69, ¶ 45, -11 (2005)).

¶ 141, & n.12 ¶ 74, & n.12 (2005).

¶ 31 , (“Typically, the word ‘including’ is ‘not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle.’ ”) (citation omitted); see also Wang v. Wen-Ning Lee, 256 S.W.3d 862, 868 (Tex.

We will reverse a conviction “if the cumulative effect of the alleged acts of misconduct ‘shows that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.’” Bocharski, , 189 P.3d at 419

so contaminated the panel that they could not fairly listen to the evidence and 12 give it the impartial deliberation [to] which [Slover] was entitled.” But a mistrial is “the most dramatic remedy for a trial error” and should only be granted when “justice will be thwarted otherwise.”

[T]he conduct [must] be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, ¶ 152

Even if the alleged acts of misconduct do not individually warrant reversal, we must determine whether the acts “contribute to a finding of persistent and pervasive misconduct.” ¶ 155

-21 ¶¶ 107, 110, -96 (2006).

The Confrontation Clause attaches to “testimonial witness statements made to a government officer to establish some fact.” ¶ 70

See State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 228, ¶ 154

We review the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial only to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict, “viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.” ¶ 93

¶¶ 48, 50-51, -86 (2006) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to order preclusion for discovery violation involving scope of expert testimony).

rizona Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law.” To violate this constitutional prohibition against commenting on the evidence, “‘the court must express an opinion as to what the evidence proves’ or ‘interfere with the jury’s independent evaluation of that evidence.’ ”