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In determining an appropriate sanction, the trial court “‘should seek to apply sanctions that affect the evidence at trial and the merits of the case as little as possible.’” ¶ 50 (2006) ().

801(c); ¶ 70 (2006); ¶ 20 (2000)).

The State must then “provide a race-neutral reason for the strike” and then the trial court “must determine whether the challenger has carried [her] burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination.” ¶ 13, (citations omitted).

a additionally argues that the instruction was erroneous because it “required the jury to find that the breath analyzer was operating properly when the state introduced the evidence, preventing independent evaluation of argument that it was not.” This requirement would, according to Peraza, violate the Arizona Constitution, which prohibits judges from “commenting on the evidence.” see also Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 27.

if the cumulative effect of the incidents shows that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.” ¶ 155, (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Such deference to the trial court is proper because of its “superior opportunity to assess the juror’s demeanor and credibility[.]” ¶ 102 (2006) (internal citation omitted).

However, prosecutorial misconduct is harmless if we are satisfied “beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to or affect the verdict.”

Even when an instance of prosecutorial misconduct does not warrant reversal, “an incident may nonetheless contribute to a finding of persistent and pervasive misconduct if the cumulative effect of the incidents shows that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice the defendant.” ¶ 155, (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 23 (2013) ( ¶ 131 (2006)).

¶ 154, (when a defendant raises an instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct for the first time on appeal, we review for fundamental error only).

¶48 The evidence of the murders’ impact on the identified neighbors is relevant to whether Leteve should be shown leniency inasmuch as it demonstrated the specific harm his killings caused to people closely linked to the family.“ The threshold for relevance is a low one,” ¶ 109, and the harm caused by a defendant’s killing is a relevant factor for the jury to consider in making its sentencing determination.

12 Appellant further argues the admission of this report constitutes prosecutorial misconduct because Appellant “would have argued [his] case different[ly].” To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, “[a] defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 152

¶ 28, –05 ¶¶ 18–20, –80 (2006).

¶¶ 33-35, ¶ 70, see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted”).

¶ 13, (citations and quotations omitted).

¶21 “Generally, evidence of other wrongs may not be used ‘to show that a defendant is a bad person or has a propensity for committing crimes.’” ¶ 54, ( and citing Ariz. R. Evid.