Cited by

“A defendant is not prejudiced by a denial of severance where the jury is instructed to consider each offense separately and advised that each must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 13 (2006) (citation modified).

In Lynch I, 225 Ariz. at 36 ¶ 37, “does not prohibit telling jurors about the particular facts of the case during voir dire.

¶ 34 (2006) (holding “the trial court clearly complied with Morgan requirements” where “the trial court required each potential juror to fill out a 23-page juror questionnaire that fully addressed Morgan issues” and the “court also conducted individual voir dire of every prospective juror whose responses raised i

See State v. (Ruben M.) Johnson, ¶ 9 (2006).

xecution by lethal injection is not cruel and unusual punishment, Lynch I, 238 Ariz. at 105 ¶ 77; (9) that it falls within the trial court’s discretion to refuse questioning about 30 STATE OF ARIZONA V. DWANDARRIUS JAMAR ROBINSON Opinion of the Court specific mitigating circumstances during voir dire, State v. (Ruben M.) Johnson, –35 ¶¶ 29–35 (2006); (10) that victim impact statements relevant to harm caused by a defendant’s criminal acts are constitutionally permissible, ¶ 17 (2003); (11) that

¶ 12 (2006) (holding gang evidence was admissible to establish defendant’s motive for killing a witness to a crime for which a younger, fellow gang member was being charged, where defendant had no connection to the victim but had a duty to protect the younger gang member); (199

s] conduct meets this definition.” Effectively, Riley is making an argument we rejected in State v. Johnson: 32 STATE V. RILEY Opinion of the Court “that the term ‘especially’ in [§ 13-751(F)(6)] 3 essentially requires some kind of comparison between death-eligible murder cases and the ‘norm.’” –32 ¶¶ 19–20 (2006) (rejecting that argument based on this Court’s prior rejection of proportionality review).

See, ¶ 15 (2009); ¶ 42 (2006); ¶ 15 (2006).

(providing narrowing definitions for “heinous,” “cruel,” and “depraved”), see State v. (Ruben M.) Johnson, –32 ¶¶ 19–22 (2006) (approving narrowing instructions and disavowing comparative review), and Johnson provides no persuasive reason for us to revisit those decisions here.

“Prejudice from a failure to sever is unlikely [i]f the evidence of one crime would have been admissible in a separate trial for the others.” ¶ 11 (2006) (citation omitted).

State v. Johnson , , ¶ 15

–38 ¶¶ 44–47, –48 (2006) (citing Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 270 (1998)).

¶ 18 (2013); Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 446, ¶ 67 (defendant could not demonstrate prejudice because court instructed jurors to consider each charged offense separately, and we “presume jurors follow the court’s instructions”); ¶ 13 (2006) (any possible prejudice from joinder was ameliorated by jury instruction to consider each offense separately).

at 51; ¶ 25 (2006) (explaining the “rules of evidence govern the admissibility of information relevant to .