Cited by

–41 ¶¶ 111–14, –24 (2006) (“These statements are relevant to the issue of the harm caused by the defendant .

¶ 20 Further, allegations of bias or prejudice on the part of a court must be specific and the supporting facts “concrete.” ¶ 37

Martinez went to the victims’ home expecting pecuniary gain, and the murder allowed him “to keep the stolen property and avoid capture.” See Martinez, 218 Ariz. at 435 ¶ 68, 189 P.3d at 362; ¶ 125, (finding pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance proven when defendant went to victims’ home to commit burglary and committed the murders to “escape and avoid identification”).

“[E]ven if a juror is sincere in his promises to uphold the law, a judge may still reasonably find a juror’s equivocation ‘about whether he would take his personal biases in the jury room’ sufficient to substantially impair his duties as a juror, allowing a strike for cause.” State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 137 ¶ 89, (quoting Glassel, 211 Ariz. at 48 ¶¶ 49-50, 116 P.3d at 1208).

This Court has observed that “there is no constitutional requirement that the sentencing proceeding jury revisit the prior guilty verdict by considering evidence of ‘residual doubt’.” ¶ 82

We have upheld dismissal when a juror is conflicted about imposing the death penalty, Prince II, 226 Ariz. at 528 ¶ 29, 250 P.3d at 1157, and we defer to the trial judge’s determination that “a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.” Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-26; ¶ 89

801(a) advisory committee note; Chavez, ¶¶ 8, 9 , 239 P.3d at 763 ; ¶¶ 54, 56 , (testimony about person’s “[n]onverbal conduct is hearsay if it is intended to be an assertion”; officer’s testimony that witness’s “actions and body language were visibly very different” at mention of defendant not intended as assertion and not hearsay); State v. Printz, 125 Ariz

In our independent review of aggravating circumstances, we have declined “to consider evidence that the sentencing jury did not hear,” ¶ 121 n.19, n. 19 (2006), and the State contends we should similarly limit our consideration of mitigation evidence in the penalty phase.

The juror’s views “need not be proven with ‘unmistakable clarity.’” ¶ 89, (quoting Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424).

The forensic pathologist further stated that “[a] lot of force was applied around the [victim‟s] neck” during the asphyxiation, which could have resulted in “a few minutes of struggle.” (evidence that suffocation takes several minutes indicative of premeditation).

See Lynch, 225 Ariz. at 41 ¶ 79, 234 P.3d at 609; ¶ 120, (“Mental anguish is established if the victim experienced significant uncertainty as to her ultimate fate.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

“Evidentiary rulings that implicate the Confrontation Clause, however, are reviewed de novo.” ¶ 42

¶ 42, Davolt, 207 Ariz. at 210 ¶ 69, 84 P.3d at 475.