Cited by

¶ 73, (finding reckless indifference when defendant bound victims and held pillow over one victim’s face).

“Even if a juror is sincere in his promises to uphold the law, a judge may still reasonably find a juror’s equivocation ‘about whether he would take his personal biases into the jury room’ sufficient to substantially impair his duties as a juror, allowing a strike for cause.” ¶ 89, (quoting Glassel, 211 Ariz. at 48 ¶ 49, 116 P.3d at 1208).

n.19 ¶ 121, n.19 (2006) (rejecting state’s claim that strangling inherently cruel).

In this case the evidence shows that Valerie was conscious after the attack began and thus “experienced significant uncertainty as to her ultimate fate.” 18 Kiles separately raises on appeal the denial of his motion for acquittal of the (F)(6) aggravator under Ariz. R. Crim.

¶38 “A death sentence cannot be upheld if the jury was 15 selected by striking for cause those who ‘voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.’” ¶ 88, (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522).

His childhood troubles deserve little value as a mitigator for the murder he committed at age thirty-three.” ¶ 136

See, -17 (2007); -12 (2005); -50 (2003); State v. Cañez, State v. Van Adams, 194 A

¶ 31, (finding that jury instruction made it clear that the penalty phase jury was responsible for the sentencing decision); ¶ 83, (rejecting defendant’s argument that A.R.S.

§ 13-703(B) (applying rules of evidence to aggravation phase); , (defendant not permitted to “complain that evidence relevant to sentencing was presented at the guilt proceeding” because “nothing prevented [Ellison] from introducing evidence from the guilt proceeding at his sentencing proceeding”)

§ 13-703(B) (applying rules of evidence to aggravation phase); (defendant not permitted to “complain that evidence relevant to sentencing was presented at the guilt proceeding” because “nothing prevented [Ellison] from introducing evidence from the guilt proceeding at his sentencing proceeding”); 111 P.3d

-36 ¶¶ 77-80, -19 (2006).

denied, 128 S. Ct. 297 (2007) (“Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have rejected the argument that a capital defendant must be allowed to present residual doubt evidence in mitigation.”); ¶ 82, cert.

Id.; , -17 (2007); , , -50 (2003).

Pandeli did not, however, “provide[] any specific evidence that his brain [functioning] was actually altered by his past alcohol and drug abuse so as to cause or contribute to his participation in the murder[].” ¶ 139, cert.

We thus noted in State v. Ellison that “there is no constitutional requirement that the sentencing proceeding jury revisit the prior guilty verdict by considering evidence of ‘residual doubt.’” ¶ 82, (citing Guzek, 546 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 1230-32), cert.

or is a major participant in the crime and acts with reckless indifference.” ¶ 71, (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987)), cert.