Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Ellison, 140 P.3d 899.
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State v. Gallardo
242 P.3d 159
Ariz. 2010
See Lynch, 225 Ariz. at 41 ¶ 79, 234 P.3d at 609; ¶ 120, (“Mental anguish is established if the victim experienced significant uncertainty as to her ultimate fate.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
- State v. Snelling 236 P.3d 409 Ariz. 2010
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State v. Snelling
236 P.3d 409
Ariz. 2010
“Evidentiary rulings that implicate the Confrontation Clause, however, are reviewed de novo.” ¶ 42
- State v. Don Chappell 236 P.3d 1176 Ariz. 2010
- State v. Don Chappell 236 P.3d 1176 Ariz. 2010
- State v. Villalobos 235 P.3d 227 Ariz. 2010
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State v. Villalobos
235 P.3d 227
Ariz. 2010
¶ 42, Davolt, 207 Ariz. at 210 ¶ 69, 84 P.3d at 475.
- State v. Lynch 234 P.3d 595 Ariz. 2010
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State v. Lynch
234 P.3d 595
Ariz. 2010
¶ 73, (finding reckless indifference when defendant bound victims and held pillow over one victim’s face).
- State v. Hargrave 234 P.3d 569 Ariz. 2010
- State v. Hargrave 234 P.3d 569 Ariz. 2010
- State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
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State v. Garcia
226 P.3d 370
Ariz. 2010
“Even if a juror is sincere in his promises to uphold the law, a judge may still reasonably find a juror’s equivocation ‘about whether he would take his personal biases into the jury room’ sufficient to substantially impair his duties as a juror, allowing a strike for cause.” ¶ 89, (quoting Glassel, 211 Ariz. at 48 ¶ 49, 116 P.3d at 1208).
- State v. Cropper 225 P.3d 579 Ariz. 2010
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State v. Cropper
225 P.3d 579
Ariz. 2010
n.19 ¶ 121, n.19 (2006) (rejecting state’s claim that strangling inherently cruel).
- State v. Lucero 220 P.3d 249 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- State v. Lucero 220 P.3d 249 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- State of Arizona v. Dean William Zinsmeyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
- State of Arizona v. Dean William Zinsmeyer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
- State v. Kiles 213 P.3d 174 Ariz. 2009
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State v. Kiles
213 P.3d 174
Ariz. 2009
In this case the evidence shows that Valerie was conscious after the attack began and thus “experienced significant uncertainty as to her ultimate fate.” 18 Kiles separately raises on appeal the denial of his motion for acquittal of the (F)(6) aggravator under Ariz. R. Crim.
- State v. Speer 212 P.3d 787 Ariz. 2009
- State v. Moore 213 P.3d 150 Ariz. 2009
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State v. Moore
213 P.3d 150
Ariz. 2009
¶38 “A death sentence cannot be upheld if the jury was 15 selected by striking for cause those who ‘voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.’” ¶ 88, (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522).
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State v. Speer
212 P.3d 787
Ariz. 2009
His childhood troubles deserve little value as a mitigator for the murder he committed at age thirty-three.” ¶ 136
- State v. Bearup 211 P.3d 684 Ariz. 2009
- State v. Bearup 211 P.3d 684 Ariz. 2009
- State of Arizona v. Lemon Montrea Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
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State of Arizona v. Lemon Montrea Johnson
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
See, -17 (2007); -12 (2005); -50 (2003); State v. Cañez, State v. Van Adams, 194 A
- State v. Dann 207 P.3d 604 Ariz. 2009
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State v. Dann
207 P.3d 604
Ariz. 2009
¶ 31, (finding that jury instruction made it clear that the penalty phase jury was responsible for the sentencing decision); ¶ 83, (rejecting defendant’s argument that A.R.S.
- State v. Nichols 195 P.3d 207 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
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State v. Nichols
195 P.3d 207
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
§ 13-703(B) (applying rules of evidence to aggravation phase); , (defendant not permitted to “complain that evidence relevant to sentencing was presented at the guilt proceeding” because “nothing prevented [Ellison] from introducing evidence from the guilt proceeding at his sentencing proceeding”)
- State of Arizona v. Scott Douglas Nordstrom Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
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State of Arizona v. Scott Douglas Nordstrom
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
§ 13-703(B) (applying rules of evidence to aggravation phase); (defendant not permitted to “complain that evidence relevant to sentencing was presented at the guilt proceeding” because “nothing prevented [Ellison] from introducing evidence from the guilt proceeding at his sentencing proceeding”); 111 P.3d
- State v. Bocharski 189 P.3d 403 Ariz. 2008
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State v. Bocharski
189 P.3d 403
Ariz. 2008
-36 ¶¶ 77-80, -19 (2006).
- State v. Armstrong 189 P.3d 378 Ariz. 2008
- State v. Armstrong 189 P.3d 378 Ariz. 2008
- State v. Martinez 189 P.3d 348 Ariz. 2008
- State v. Martinez 189 P.3d 348 Ariz. 2008
- State v. Boggs 185 P.3d 111 Ariz. 2008
- State v. Boggs 185 P.3d 111 Ariz. 2008
- State v. Harrod 183 P.3d 519 Ariz. 2008
- State v. McCray 183 P.3d 503 Ariz. 2008
- State v. McCray 183 P.3d 503 Ariz. 2008
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State v. Harrod
183 P.3d 519
Ariz. 2008
denied, 128 S. Ct. 297 (2007) (“Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have rejected the argument that a capital defendant must be allowed to present residual doubt evidence in mitigation.”); ¶ 82, cert.
- State v. Cheramie 171 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
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State v. Cheramie
171 P.3d 1253
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Id.; , -17 (2007); , , -50 (2003).
- State v. Velazquez 166 P.3d 91 Ariz. 2007